Section 6.
SECTION 6.
Zelotes produces his first objection to a reconciliation with Honestus, taken from God’s foreknowledge — Our Lord is introduced as answering for himself, and showing how his prescience is consistent with our liberty, and his goodness with the just destruction of those who obstinately sin away their day of initial salvation — The absurdity of supposing that God cannot certainly know future events, which depend upon the will of free agents, because we cannot.
WHILE Honestus says that he has no great objection to the doctrine of free grace, when it is stated in a rational and Scriptural manner, Zelotes intimates that he is still averse to the doctrine of free will; and declares that capital objections are in his way, and that, till they are answered, he thinks it his duty equally to oppose Honestus and the reconciler. Hear we then his objections, and let us see if they are as unanswerable as he supposes them to be.
OBJECTION I. “You want to frighten me from the doctrines of grace, and to drive into the heresy of the free willers, by perpetually urging that the personal, unconditional, and eternal rejection of the non-elect is inconsistent with Divine mercy, goodness, and justice: but you either deny, or grant God’s foreknowledge. If you deny it, you are an Atheist: it being evident that an ignorant God is no God at all. If you allow it, you must allow that when God made such men as Cain and Judas he foreknew that they would certainly deserve to be damned; and that when he made them upon that foreknowledge, he made them that they might necessarily deserve to be damned. And is not this granting all that we contend for, namely, that God does make, and of consequence has an indisputable right of making ‘vessels of wrath,’ without any respect to works and free will? Is it not far better to say that we have no free will, than to rob God of his prescience?”
ANSWER. We need neither rob God of his prescience, nor man of his free will. I grant, God made angels and men, that if they would not be eternally saved, they might be damned. But what has this doctrine to do with yours, which supposes that he made some angels and men that they might absolutely and necessarily be damned? Is not our doctrine highly consistent with God’s goodness and justice; while yours is the reverse of these Divine perfections? Again: —
Your argument, though ingenious, is inconclusive, because it is founded upon the common mistake of shifting the words upon which it chiefly turns. The flaw of it consists in substituting the clause “necessarily deserve to be damned,” instead of the clause “certainly deserve to be damned,” just as if there was no difference between certainty and necessity! But a little attention will convince you of your error. It is certain that I write this moment, but am I necessitated to it? May I not drop my pen, and meditate, read, or walk? The chasm which, in many cases, separates absolute certainty from absolute necessity, is as immense as that which stands between a point and infinity. Take notice of the insect that buzzes about your ears: does it not exist as certainly as God himself? But would it not be a kind of blasphemy to say that it exists as necessarily? Would it not at least be paying to a fly an honour which is due to none but God, the only supreme and absolutely necessary being? And when you support your doctrines of grace by confounding certainty with necessity, do you not support them by confounding two things, which, in a thousand cases, and especially in the present one, have no more connection than the two poles? Have not judicious Calvinists granted that although the prescience of God concerning Judas’ destruction could not stand (cum eventu contrario) “with his salvation;” yet it stood perfectly well (cum possibilitate ad eventum contrarium) “with the possibility of his salvation?” And is not this granting that although God clearly saw that Judas would not repent, he clearly saw also that Judas might have repented “in the accepted time,” which is all that I contend for? (See Davenant’s Animad. Cambridge edition, 1641, p. 38.)
To be a little more explicit: let me again intreat you to fall with me before the throne of grace, where the Redeemer teaches mortals to be “meek, lowly, and wise in the heart.” Spread your doubts before him in such humble language as this: “Thou light of the world, let not thy creature remain in darkness with respect to the most important question in the world. Am I appointed necessarily to continue in sin and be damned? Is my damnation finished? Hast thou absolutely ordained me to be a vessel of wrath, and irrevocably appointed my eternal rejection without any respect to my personal free will? Does thy foreknowledge necessitate my actions? Or may I choose life or death, and, through thy mercy or justice, have either the one or the other, according to my free, unnecessitated choice — my choice equally opposed to unwillingness and to necessity? Speak, gracious Lord, that if I am a necessary agent, I may, without any farther perplexity, yield myself to be carried by the irresistible stream of thy free grace, or of thy free wrath, to the throne in heaven, or to the dungeon in hell, which thou hast appointed for me from all eternity, according to the doctrine of the heathen poet: —
‘Sovite mortales animos, curisque levate:
Fata regunt orbem, certa stant omnia lege.’” f35
If Christ is the Logos; if he is reason and the Word — the eternal wisdom, and the uncreated Word of the Father; may we not get a satisfactory answer to the preceding question by considering, with humble prayer, his unerring word, and by diligently listening to the reason which he has given us? And shall I take an unbecoming liberty, if I suppose that he himself expostulates with Zelotes in such words as these?
“Son of man, if thou chargest the reprobation of the damned, or their predestination to eternal death upon my free wrath, my sovereignty, or Adam’s sin, thou insultest my goodness and justice. That reprobation has no properly original cause, but their own personal free will. I would a thousand times have crushed thy primitive parents into atoms, when they forfeited my favour, rather than I would have spared them to propagate a race of creatures, most of whom, according to thy doctrines, are under an absolute necessity to sin and be damned. Thou hast a wrong idea of my word and attributes. With the wisdom and equity of a tender-hearted judge I condemn the victims of my justice, and I do it merely for their personal and obstinate contempt of my free grace. Be then no longer mistaken: my decree of reprobation is nothing but a fixed resolution of giving sinners over to the perverseness of their free will, if they resist the drawings of my free grace to the end of their day of initial salvation. And what can be more equitable than such a resolution? Is it not right that free agents, who to the last despise my goodness, should become monuments of my despised goodness, which is but another name for my vindictive justice? “I foresaw, indeed, that, by such a final contempt of my grace, many would bring destruction upon themselves; but having wisely decreed to make a world of probationers and free agents, I could not necessarily incline their will to obedience, without robbing them of free agency: nor could I rob them of free agency without foolishly defeating the counsel of my own mind, and absurdly spoiling the work of my own hands. Beside, from the beginning my intention was not only to show my power and goodness in creating, but also to display my wisdom and justice in governing accountable creatures, to whom ‘without respect of persons, I should render according to their works — eternal life to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory; but tribulation and anguish to them that are contentious and disobedient.’
“I abhor extorted, forced, necessary submission in rationals: it suits the dastardly children of the devil, and not the free-born sons of God. I could not then in wisdom send upon this world such overpowering streams of light; or permit the tempter to spread such thick darkness upon it, as might invincibly or necessarily turn the scale of man’s will for loyalty or rebellion. So unadvised a step would immediately have taken them out of the probation in which I had placed them.
“Again: had I directly or indirectly thrown into the scale a weight sufficient to turn it irresistibly, I should have acted a most unreasonable and detestable part:
(1.) A most unreasonable part: for if I alone completely ‘work out the salvation’ of believers, according to what thou callest finished salvation, nothing can be more absurd than my appointing a day of judgment and rewards, to bestow upon the elect an eternal life of glory according to their works.
(2.) A most detestable part: for if I earnestly invited all the wicked to choose life, after having absolutely chosen death for most of them, should I not show myself the most hypocritical of all tyrants?
“But thou stumblest at my foreknowledge, and askest why I bestow the blessings of initial salvation upon those whose free agency will certainly abuse my goodness, and do despite to the Spirit of my saving grace. Thou thinkest it is wrong in me to give them that will perish the cup of initial salvation, when I know they will not accept the cup of eternal salvation. Thou supposest it would be better to reprobate them at once, than to expose them to a greater damnation, by putting it in their power to reject the terms of eternal salvation, and by that mean to fall from initial salvation. But I shall silence thy objections by proposing some plain questions to thee, as I once did to my servant Job.
1. “Is it reasonable to suppose that I should pervert my nature, and act in a manner contrary to my perfections, to prevent free agents from perverting their nature, and acting in a manner contrary to their happiness? What wouldest thou have thought of my wisdom if I had appointed Lucifer to hell, and Adam to the grave, from eternity, for fear they should deserve those punishments by wilfully falling from heaven and from paradise? Is it not absurd to fancy that the Creator must bring himself in guilty of misconduct, lest his rational creatures should render themselves so?
2. “If thou thinkest it right in me to command the Gospel of my free grace to be preached to ‘every creature,’ although thou knowest that the neglecters of it will, like the people of Capernaum, fall into a deeper hell for their final contempt of that favour; why shouldest thou think it wrong in me to extend the virtue of my blood, and the strivings of my Spirit to those who will finally reject my free grace? When thou approvest the extensive tenor of my Gospel commission, dost thou well to be angry, or to fret, like Jonah, at the extensiveness of my mercy? Dost thou not see that if I were absolutely merciless toward some men, my commission to preach the Gospel to every man would be utterly inconsistent with my veracity?
3. “Have I not a right to create free agents, and to place them in a state of probation, that I may wisely reward their obedience, or justly punish their rebellion? ‘Who art thou, that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it,’ Why hast thou made me a free agent? a probationer for heavenly rewards, or infernal punishments? May not I appoint that free-willing unbelievers, who do final despite to the Spirit of my free grace, shall be ‘vessels of wrath, self fitted for destruction;’ and that free-willing, obedient believers shall be ‘vessels of mercy, afore prepared unto glory’ by my free grace, with which their free will has happily concurred?
4. “In the nature of things must not free agents, in a state of probation, be free to fall, as well as free to stand? When thou weighest gold, if thou hinderest one scale from turning, dost thou not effectually hinder the free motion of the other scale?
5. “Does it not become me to show myself good and gracious, though my creatures prove wicked and ungrateful? Should I extinguish or restrain my light, because some people love darkness rather than light? If they will not do their duty by me, as obedient creatures, ought I not to behave to them as a gracious Creator, and to hold out the golden sceptre of my mercy, before I strike them with the iron rod of my vengeance? And should not the honour of my Divine attributes be considered more than the additional degrees of misery, which ungrateful free agents will obstinately bring upon themselves?
6. “When I had decreed to create a world of free agents, and to try their loyalty, in order to reward the obedient and punish the rebellious, could I execute my wise, just, and gracious plan without suffering sin to enter into the world, if free agents would commit it? Is permitting the possibility of sin, any more than permitting that free will might, or might not concur with my free grace? And could I ever have judged the world in righteousness, if I had not permitted such a possibility?
7. “If I had given the casting vote for Peter’s obedience, and for Judas’ disobedience, should I not have fixed an eternal blot upon my impartiality? Thinkest thou that I could be so unwise and unjust as to hold a universal judgment, to judge angels and men according to what they have done through mere necessity? Shall irresistible free grace, and omnipotent free wrath, force the human will? and shall I reward or punish overpowered mankind according to such constraint? Far be the thought from thee! Far be the iniquity from me! I judge the world in righteousness, and not in madness; according to their own works, and not according to mine.
8. “When I foresaw that sin would enter into the world, could I have been just if I had not decreed to punish sinners? Could I, with justice, sentence moral agents either to non-existence, or to a wretched existence, BEFORE they had done wickedly? — AFTER they had sinned, and I had graciously promised them a Saviour, could I, without showing myself full of dissimulation, partiality, and falsehood, condemn those that perish, BEFORE I had afforded them the means of recovery, by which many of their fellow sinners, under the same circumstances, attain eternal salvation? Must not, in the nature of things, those who work out their damnation be doubly guilty, or I be notoriously partial? Must they not appear without excuse before all; or I without mercy, long suffering, and truth toward them?
9. “Dost thou not see that although the ministration of righteousness and rewards ‘exceeds in glory,’ yet the ministration of condemnation and punishments ‘is glorious?’ Beside, are they not closely connected together? Has not the fear of hell, as well as the hope of heaven, kept thousands of martyrs from drawing back to perdition, when the snares of death compassed them about? Nay, is not ‘the spirit of bondage unto fear’ the beginning of wisdom, and, generally, of the conversion of the heart of man to me? And shall I act a deceitful part for thousands of years together, working upon my people by a lie, and making them believe that they have damnation if they disbelieve, or if they cast off their first faith, when yet (upon thy scheme) there is nothing but finished salvation for them?
10. “Will not the damnation of obstinate sinners answer as important ends in the world of rationals, as prisons and places of execution do in the kingdoms of this world? If incorrigible, free-willing rebels sin to all eternity, will it not be just in me to make the line of their punishment run parallel with the line of their wickedness? Does not thy reason dictate that an unceasing contempt of my holy law, and a perpetual rebellion against creating, redeeming, and sanctifying grace, will call aloud for a perpetual outpouring of my righteous indignation? And does it not follow that the eternal damnation of rebels eternally obstinate — of rebels who have wantonly trampled under foot the blessings of initial salvation, is as consistent with my despised goodness, as with my provoked justice?
11. “As I could not justly condemn necessary agents to infernal misery; so I could not delight in, and reward the obedience of such agents. And as thou hast more pleasure in the free, loving motions of one of thy friends, than in the necessary motions of ten thousand pieces of clock work, let them move ever so regularly, so do I put more value upon the free, voluntary obedience of one of my people, than upon all the necessary revolutions of all the planetary worlds. Why then wilt thou, by thy doctrine of bound will, rob me of what I value most in the universe — the free obedience of my faithful servants — the unforced, spontaneous love of my mystical body, my spouse, my Church?
12. “With respect to my foreknowledge of sin, it had absolutely no influence on the commission of it. Thou thinkest the contrary, because thou canst not, in general, certainly foresee what thy neighbours will do, unless they are absolutely directed and influenced by thee: but the consequence does not hold. Short sighted as thou art, dost thou not sometimes with a degree of certainty foresee things which thou art so far from appointing, that thou wouldest gladly prevent them, if thou didst not consider that such a step would be inconsistent with thy wisdom, and the liberty of others?
13. “Again: may not my foreknowledge of a future event imply the certainty of that event with respect to me, without implying its necessity with respect to the free agent who spontaneously causes it? Suppose thou wert perfectly acquainted with the art of navigation, the force of every wind, the situation of every rock and sand bank, the strength and burden of every ship, the disposition and design of every mariner, &c: suppose again thou sawest a ship going full sail just against a dangerous rock, notwithstanding thy repeated signals and loud warnings to the pilot; mightest thou not foresee the certain loss of the ship, without laying the least necessity upon the pilot to steer her upon the fatal spot where she goes to pieces? And shall not I, from whom no secrets are hid, and before whom things past and to come meet in one immovable, everlasting NOW: — shall not I, ‘who inhabit eternity,’ where he ‘that was, and is, and is to come,’ shows himself the unchangeable I AM, — shall not I, I say, foresee the motions and actions of all my free-acting creatures, as certainly as a wise artist foresees the motions of the watch which he has made? Imperfect as the illustration is, it is adapted to thy imperfect understanding. For though thou canst not comprehend how I know future contingencies, thou canst easily conceive, that as no one but a watch maker can perfectly foresee what may accelerate, stop, or alter the motion of a watch, so none but the Creator of a free agent can perfectly foresee the future motions of a free agent. If ‘hell is naked, and destruction hath no covering before me,’ is it not absurd to suppose that the human heart can be hid from my all-piercing eye? And if thou, who livest but in a point of time, and in a point of space; — if thou, whose faculties are so shallow, and whose powers are so circumscribed; — if thou, I say, in that point of time and space which thou fillest, canst see what is before thee, why should not I, an all-wise and superlatively perfect Spirit, who fill all times, and all places, through an infinite NOW and a boundless HERE, see also what is before me? Perceivest thou not the absurdity of measuring me with thy span? Try to weigh the mountains in a balance, and to measure the seas in the hollow of thy hand; and if thou findest thyself confounded at the bare thought of a task so easy to my omnipotence, fall in the dust, and confess that thou hast acted an unbecoming part, in attempting to put the very same bounds to my omniscience, which I have put to thy foreknowledge. To conclude: —
14. “Thou art ready to think hardly of my wisdom goodness, or foresight, for giving a talent of saving grace to a man, who, by burying it to the last, enhances his own destruction. To solve this imaginary difficulty, thou ascribest to me a dreadful sovereignty — a horrible right of making vessels to dishonour, and filling them with wrath, merely to show my absolute power. But let me expostulate a moment with thee. I foresaw, indeed, that the slothful, unfaithful man, to whom I gave one talent, would bury it to the last: but if I had kept it from him; if I had afforded him no opportunity of showing his faithfulness, or his unfaithfulness; what could I have done with him? Had I sent him to hell upon foreseen disobedience, I should have acted the absurd and cruel part of a judge who hangs an honest man to-day, under pretence that he foresees the honest man will turn thief to-morrow; — had I taken him to heaven, I should have rewarded foreseen unfaithfulness with heavenly glory. And, had I refused to let him come into existence, my refusal would have been attended with a glaring absurdity, and with two great inconveniences.
(1.) With a glaring absurdity; for if I foresee that a man will certainly bury his talent; and if, upon this foresight, I refuse that man existence, it follows I foresaw that a thing which shall never come to pass, shall certainly come to pass. And what can be more unworthy of me, and more absurd, than such a foresight?
(2.) The notion that my foreknowledge of the man’s burying his talent should have made me suppress his existence, is big with two great inconveniences. For, first, I should have defeated my own purpose, which was to show my distributive justice by rewarding him, if he would be faithful; or by punishing him, if he would continue in his unfaithfulness. And, secondly, I should have broken, almost without interruption, the laws of the natural world, and nipped the man’s righteous posterity in the bud. Had I, for instance, prevented the wickedness of all the ancestors of the Virgin Mary, by forbidding their existence, ten times over I might have suppressed her useful being, and my own important humanity. Nay, at this rate, I might have destroyed all mankind twenty times over. Drop then thy prejudices; be not wise above what is written for thy instruction. Under pretence of exalting free grace, do not pour contempt upon free will, which is my masterpiece in man, as man himself is my masterpiece in this world. Remember that hell is the just wages which abused free grace gives to free-willing, incorrigible sinners; and that heaven is the gracious reward with which my free grace, when it is submitted to, crowns the obedience of corrigible persevering believers. Nor forget that, if thou oppose the doctrine of free grace, thou wilt undermine my cross, and insult me as a Saviour: and if thou decry the doctrine of free will, thou wilt sap the foundation of my tribunal, and affront me as a judge.”
To the arguments contained in the preceding plea, I add an extract from a discourse written, I think, by Archbishop King, with a design to reconcile the Predestinarians and the free willers.
“Foreknowledge and decrees,” says that judicious writer, “are only assigned to God, to give us a notion of the steadiness and certainty of the Divine actions; and if so, for us to conclude that what is represented by them is inconsistent with the contingency of events or free will, &c. is the same absurdity as to conclude that China is no bigger than a sheet of paper, because the map that represents it is contained in that compass.”
The same ingenious author proposes the argument that has so puzzled mankind, and done so much mischief in the world. It runs thus: — “If God foresee, &c, that I shall be saved, I shall infallibly be so; and if he foresee, &c, that I shall be damned, it is unavoidable. And therefore it is no matter what I do, or how I behave myself in this life.” “If God’s foreknowledge were exactly conformable to ours, the consequence would seem just; but, &c, it does not follow, because our foresight of events, if we suppose it infallible, must presuppose a necessity in them, that therefore the Divine prescience must require the same necessity in order to its being certain. It is true we call God’s foreknowledge and our own by the same name; but this is not from any real likeness in the nature of the faculties, but from some proportion observable in the effects of them; both having this advantage, that they prevent any surprise on the person endowed with them. Now as it is true that no contingency or freedom in the creatures can any way deceive or surprise God, put him to a loss, or oblige him to alter his measures; so on the other hand it is likewise true that the Divine prescience does not hinder freedom: and a thing may either be, or not be, notwithstanding that foresight of it which we ascribe to God. When therefore it is alleged that if God foresees I shall be saved, my salvation is infallible; this does not follow: because the foreknowledge of God is not like man’s, which requires necessity in the event, in order to its being certain; but of another nature consistent with contingency: and our inability to comprehend this arises from our ignorance of the true nature of what we call foreknowledge in God, &c. Only of this we are sure, that it so differs from ours that it may consist either with the being, or not being of what is said to be foreseen, &c. Thus St. Paul was a chosen vessel, and he reckons himself in the number of the predestinated, Ephesians 1:5. And yet he supposes it possible for him to miss of salvation: and therefore he looked upon himself as obliged to use mortification, and exercise all other graces, in order to make his calling and election sure; ‘lest,’ he says, ‘that, by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway,’ or a reprobate, as the word is translated in other places.” This author’s important observation, concerning the difference between God’s foreknowledge and ours, may be illustrated by the following remarks: — Hearing and sight are attributed to God, as well as foreknowledge and foresight. “He that planted the ear,” says David, “shall he not hear? And he that formed the eye, shall he not see?” Now is it not as absurd to measure God’s perfect manner of foreseeing and foreknowing, by our imperfect foresight and knowledge, as to measure his perfect manner of seeing and hearing by our imperfect manner of doing them? If Zelotes said, “I cannot see the inhabitants of the planets: I cannot see the antipodes: I cannot see through that wall: I can see nothing of solids but their surface, &c, therefore GOD cannot see the inhabitants of the planets, the antipodes,” &c, would not his argument appear to you inconclusive? Nevertheless, it is full as strong as the following, on which Zelotes’ objection is founded: — “I cannot certainly foresee the free thoughts and contingent intentions of the human heart, therefore God cannot do it: I am not omniscient, therefore God is not so.” If I argued in this manner, would you not say,” O injudicious man, how long wilt thou measure God’s powers by thine? See, if thou canst, what now passes in my breast? Nay, see thy own back; see the fibres which compose the flesh of thy hands, or the vapour that exhales out of all thy pores. And if these near — these present — these material objects are out of the reach of thy sight, what wonder is it if future contingencies are out of the reach of thy foresight? Cease then to confine God’s foreknowledge within the narrow limits of thine, and own that an omnipresent, omniscient, and everlasting Spirit, who ‘is overall, through all, and in all,’ and whose permanent existence and boundless immensity comprehend all times and places, as the atmosphere contains all clouds and vapours; — own, I say, that such a Spirit can, at one glance, see from his eternity all the revolutions of time far more clearly than thou canst see the characters which thine eyes are now fixed upon. And confess that it is the highest absurdity to suppose that an omnipresent, omnipotent, spiritual, and eternal eye, which is before, behind, and in all things, times, and places, can ever be at a loss to know or foreknow any thing. And what is God but such an eye? And what are Divine knowledge and foreknowledge, but the sight of such a spiritual, eternal, and omnipresent eye?”
I do not know whether this vindication of our free agency, of God’s foreknowledge, and of the consistency of both will please my readers: but I flatter myself that it will satisfy Candidus. Should it soften the prejudices of Zelotes, without hardening those of Honestus, it will promote the reconciliation which I endeavour to bring about, and answer the end which I proposed when I took up the pen to throw some light upon this deep and awful part of my subject.