Section 8.
SECTION 8.
The fourth objection of Zelotes to a reconciliation with Honestus — In answer to it the reconciler proves, by a variety of quotations from the writings of the fathers, and of some eminent divines, and by the tenth article of our Church, that the doctrines of free grace and free will, as they are laid down in the Scripture Scales, are the very doctrines of the primitive Church, and of the Church of England — These doctrines widely differ from the tenets of the Pelagians and ancient semi-Pelagians.
OBJECTION IV. “You have done your best to vindicate the doctrine of moderate free willers, and to point out a middle way between the sentiments of Honestus and mine, or to speak your own language, between rigid free willers and rigid bound willers, but you have not yet gained your end: for, if you have Pelagius and Mr. Wesley on your side, the primitive Church and the Church of England are for us: nor are we afraid to err in so good company.”
ANSWER. I have already observed that, like true Protestants, we rest our cause upon right reason and plain scriptures: and that both are for us, the preceding sections, I hope, abundantly prove. Nevertheless, to show you that the two Gospel axioms can be defended upon any ground, I shall, first, call in the Greek and Latin fathers, that you may hear from their own mouths how greatly they dissent from you. Secondly, to corroborate their testimony I shall show that St. Augustine himself, and judicious Calvinists have granted all that we contend for concerning free will and the conditionality of eternal salvation. And, thirdly, I shall confirm the sentiment of the fathers by our articles of religion, one of which particularly guards the doctrine of free will evangelically connected with and subordinated to free grace.
I. I grant that when St. Augustine was heated by his controversy with Pelagius, he leaned too much toward the doctrine of fate; meaning by it the overruling, efficacious will and power of the Deity, whereby he sometimes rashly hinted that all things happen: (see the note, page 185:) but in his best moments he happily dissented from himself, and agreed with the other fathers. Take some proofs of their aversion to fatalism and bound will, and of their attachment to our supposed “heresy.”
1. JUSTIN MARTYR, who flourished in the second century, says: — Si fato fieret ut esset aut improbus aut bonus; nec alii quidem probi essent nec alii mali. (Apol. 2.) That is, “If it happen by fate (or necessity) that men are either good or wicked; the good were not good, nor should the wicked be wicked.”
2. TERTULLIAN, his contemporary, is of the same sentiment: Cœterum nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei, qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuit inventus, non voluntate. (TERT. lib. 2, contra Marc.) “No reward can be justly bestowed, no punishment justly inflicted upon him who is good or bad by necessity, and not by his own choice.” In the fifth chapter of the same book he asserts that God has granted man liberty of choice, ut sui dominus constanter occurreret, et bono sponte servando, et malo sponte vitando: quoniam et alias positum hominem sub judicio Dei, oportebat justum illud efficere de arbitrii sui meritis: “that he might constantly be master of his own conduct by voluntarily doing good, and by voluntarily avoiding evil: because, man being appointed for God’s judgment, it was necessary to the justice of God’s sentence that man should be judged according to [meritis] the deserts of his free will.”
3. IRENÆUS, bishop of Lyons, who flourished also in the second century, bears thus his testimony against bound will: — Homo vero rationabilis, et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber arbitrio factus, et suæ potestatis, ipse sibi causa est ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat; quapropter et juste condemnabitur. (Lib. iv, adv. Hæret. cap. 9.) That is, “Man, a reasonable being, and in that respect like God, is made free in his will; and being endued with power to conduct himself, he is a cause of his becoming sometimes wheat and sometimes chaff; f43 therefore will he be justly condemned.” Again: Dedit ergo Deus bonum, &c, et qui operantur quidum illud, gloriam et honorem percipient. quoniam operati sunt bonum, cum possent non operari illud, Hi autem qui illud non operantur, judicium Dei nostri recipient, quoniam non sunt operati bonum cum possent operari illud: “God gives goodness, and they who do good shall obtain honour and glory; because they have done good, when they could forbear doing it. And they who do it not, shall receive the just judgment of our God; because they have not done good, when they could have done it.” Once more: Non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum, et suæ potestatis, arbitrium servavit homini Deus. (Ibid. lib. 4, cap. 62.) “God has left man’s will free, and at his own disposal, not only with regard to works, but also with regard to faith.” Nor did Irenæus say here more than St. Augustine does in this well-known sentence: Posse credere est omnium, credere vero fidelium: “To have a power to believe is the prerogative of all men; but actually to believe is the prerogative of the faithful.”
4. ORIGEN nobly contends for liberty: he grants rather too much than too little of it: he continually recommends kalhn proairesin, “a good choice,” which he frequently calls thn rophn tou autexousiou, “the inclination of the powerful principle whereby we are masters of our own conduct.” He observes that we are not at liberty to see, but (to krinai — to crhsasqai thn rophn,thn eudokhsin)” to judge; to use our power of choice and our approbation.” And in the solution of some scriptures, which seem to contradict one another, he refutes the sentiment of those who reject the doctrine of our co-operating with Divine grace, and who think ouk hmeteron ergon einai to kat’ arethn bioun, alla panta qeian carin, “That it is not our own work to lead a virtuous life, but that it is entirely the work of Divine grace.”
5. ST. CYPRIAN and LACTANTUS speak the same language, as the learned reader may see by turning to the seventh book of Vossius’ History of Pelagianism. Nor did St. Basil dissent from them, if we may judge of his sentiments by the following passage, which is extracted from his thirty-seventh homily, where he proves that God is not the author of evil: — “What is forced is not pleasing to God, but what is done from a truly virtuous motive, and virtue comes from the will, not from necessity.” Hence it appears that, in this father’s account, necessity is a kind of compulsion contrary to the freedom of the will. “For,” adds he, “the will depends on what is within us; and within us is free will.”
6. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS is of one mind with his brother ST. BASIL. For speaking of faith, he says, that it is placed “within the reach of our free election.” And again: “We say of faith what the Gospel contains, namely, that he who is begotten by spiritual regeneration, knows of whom he is begotten, and what kind of a living creature he becomes. For spiritual regeneration is the only kind of regeneration which puts it in our power to become what we choose to be.” (Greg. Catech. Disc. chap. 36, and chap. 6.)
7. ST. CHRYSOSTOM is so noted an advocate for free will, that CALVIN complains first of him. Part of Calvin’s complaint runs thus: — Habet Chrysostomus alicubi, &c. (Inst. lib. 2, cap. 2, sec. 4.) That is, “St. Chrysostom says somewhere, ‘Forasmuch as God has put good and evil in our own power, (electionis liberum donavit arbitrium,) he has given us a free power to choose the one or the other; and as he does not retain us against our will, so he embraces us when we are willing.’“ Again: “Often a wicked man, if he will, is changed into a good man; and a good man, through sloth, falls away f44 and becomes wicked; because God has endued us with free agency: nor does he make us do things necessarily, but he places proper remedies before us, and suffers all to be done according to the will of the patient,” &c. From these words of St. Chrysostom, Calvin draws this conclusion: — Porro Græci præ aliis, atque inter eos singulariter Chrysostomus, in extollenda humanæ voluntatis facultate modum excesserunt. That is, “The Greek fathers above others, and among them especially Chrysostom, have exceeded the bounds in extolling the power of the human will.” Hence it appears that, Calvin himself being judge, the fathers, but more particularly the Greek fathers, and among them St. Chrysostom, strongly opposed bound will and necessity.
8. ST. AMBROSE, a Latin father, was also a strenuous defender of the second Gospel axiom, which stands or falls with the doctrine of free will. Take two proofs of it: — Ideo omnibus opera sanitatis detulit, ut quicunque periret mortis suæ causas sibi adscribat; qui curari noluit cum remedium haberet quo posset evadere. (Amb. lib. 2, de Cain et Abel, cap. 12.) That is, “God affords to all the means of recovery, that whoever perishes may impute his own destruction to himself; for-as much as he would not be cured when he had a remedy whereby he might have escaped.” Again, commenting upon these words of Christ, “It is not mine to give,” &c, he says, Non est meum qui Justitiam servo, non Gratiam. Denique ad Patrem referens addidit, “ Quibus paratum est,” ut ostendat Patrem quoque non petitionibus deferre solere, sed MERITIS; quia Deus personarum acceptor non est. Unde et apostolus ait, “Quos præscivit prædestinavit.” Non enim ante prædestinavit. (Amb. de fide. cap. 4.) That is, “It is not mine [to give the next seat to my person] in point of justice, for I do not speak in point of favour; and referring the matter to his Father, he adds, To them for whom it is prepared, to show that the Father also [in point of reward] is not wont to yield to prayer, but (meritis) to worthiness; because God [when he acts as judge and rewarder] is no respecter of persons. Hence it is that the apostle says, Those whom God foreknew he predestinated. For he did not predestinate to reward them before he foreknew them” [as persons fit to be rewarded.] From this excellent quotation it appears that St. Ambrose maintained the two Gospel axioms, or the doctrines of grace and justice, of favour and worthiness, on which hang the election of distinguishing grace, and the election of remunerative justice, which the Calvinists perpetually confound, and which I have explained, section twelfth.
9. ST. JEROME, warm as he was against Pelagius, is evidently of the same mind with the other fathers, where he says: — Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur. Alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio nec corona est. That is, “God hath endued us with free will. We are not necessarily drawn either to virtue or to vice. For where necessity rules, there is no room left either for damnation or for the crown.” Again, in his third book against the Pelagians, he says: — Etiam his qui mali futuri sunt, dari protestatem conversionis et penitentiæ. That is, “Even to those who shall be wicked, God gives power to repent and turn to him.” Again, upon Isaiah i, Liberum servat arbitrium, ut in utramque partem, non ex præjudicio Dei, sed ex meritis singulorum, vel pæna vel præmium sit. “Our will is kept free to turn either way, that God may dispense his rewards and punishments, not according to his own prejudice, but according to the merits [that is, according to the works] of every one.” Once more: he says to Ctesiphon, Frustra blasphemas, et ignorantium auribus ingeris, nos Liberium Arbitrium condemnare. Damnetur ille qui damnat. That is, “You speak evil of us without ground; you tell the ignorant that we condemn free will; but let the man who condemns it, be condemned.”
When I read these explicit testimonies of ST. JEROME, in favour of free will, I no longer wonder that Calvin should find fault with him, as well as with ST. CHRYSOSTOM. Take Calvin’s own words: (Inst. lib. 2, cap. 2, sec. 4.) Ait Hieronymus (Dial. 3, contra Pelag. &c.) Nostrum [est] offerre quod possumus; Illius [Dei] implere quod non possumus. “Jerome says, (in his third dialogue against Pelagianism,) it is our part to offer what we can. It is God’s part to fill up what we cannot. You see clearly by these quotations,” adds Calvin, “that they [these fathers, upon the Calvinian plan,] attributed to man too much power to be virtuous.” Such a conclusion naturally becomes Calvin. But what I cannot help wondering at is, that Zelotes should indifferently call all the advocates for free will, Pelagians, when St. Jerome, who, next to St. Augustine, distinguished himself by his opposition to Pelagianism, is so strenuous a defender of the doctrine of free will, in the books which he wrote against Pelagius.
10. EPIPHANIUS confirms this doctrine where he says, Sane quidem justius a stellis, quæ necessitatem pariunt, pœnaæ repetantur, quam ab eo qui quod agit necessitate aductus aggreditur. (Epiph. advers. Hær. 50. 1.) “It would be more just to punish the stars, which make a wicked action necessary, than to punish the poor man, who does that wicked action by necessity.” He expresses himself still more strongly in the same book. Speaking of the Pharisees, who were rigid Predestinarians, he says, Est illud vero extremæ cujusdam imperitiæ, ne dicam amentiæ, cum resurrectionem mortuorum esse fateare, ac justissimum cujusque facti judicium constitutum, fatum nihilominus esse ullum asserere. Qui enim duo ista convenire possunt, JUDICIUM atque FATUM! That is, “It is extreme ignorance, not to say madness, to allow the resurrection of the dead, and a day of most righteous judgment for every action; and at the same time to assert that there is a destiny; for how can these two agree together, a JUDGMENT AND A DESTINY?” (or necessity?)
11. ST. BERNARD grants rather more liberty than I contend for, where he says, Sola voluntas, quoniam pro ingenita libertate aut dissentire sibi, aut præter se in aliquo consentire nulla vi nulla cogitur necessitate, non immerito justum vel injustum, beatitudine seu miseria dignam ac capacem creaturam constituit, prout scilicet justitiæ, injustitiæve consenserit. (Bern. De Grat. et lib. Arb.) That is, “The will alone can make a man deservedly just or unjust, and can deservedly render him fit for bliss or misery, as it consents either to righteousness or to iniquity; forasmuch as the will, according to its innate liberty, cannot be forced to will or nill any thing against its own dictates.”
12. CYRILLUS ALEXANDRIUS upon John, (book vi, chap. 21,) vindicating God’s goodness against the horrid hints of those who make him the author of sin, as all rigid Predestinarians do, says with great truth: — “The visible sun rises above our horizon, that it may communicate the gift of its brightness to all, and make its light shine upon all; but if any one shut his eyes or willingly turn himself from the sun, refusing the benefit of its light, he wants its illumination, and remains in darkness: not through the fault of the sun, but through his own fault. Thus the true Sun who came to enlighten those that sit in darkness, visited the earth, that in different manners and degrees he might impart to all the gift of knowledge and grace, and illuminate the inward eyes of all, &c. But many reject the gift of this heavenly light freely given to them, and have closed the eyes of their minds, lest so excellent an irradiation of the eternal light should shine unto them. It is not then through the defect of the true Sun, but only through their own iniquity,” i.e. through their own perverse free will. And, (book i, chap. 11,)the same father, speaking on the same subject, says, “Let not the world accuse the word of God and his eternal light; but its own weakness: for the Sun enlightens, but man rejects the grace that is given him, blunts the edge of the understanding granted him, &c, and, as a prodigal, turns his sight to the creatures, neglecting to go forward, and through laziness and negligence [not through necessity and predestination] buries the illumination, and despises this grace.”
13. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS is exactly of the same sentiment; for, calling “the Divine word” what St. Cyril calls “Divine light,” he says, “The Divine word has cried; calling all, knowing well those that will not obey; and yet, because it is in our power, either to obey or not to obey, that none may plead ignorance, it has made a righteous call, and requireth but that which is according to the ability and strength of every one.” (CLEM ALEX. Strom. book 2.)
14. The father who wrote the book De Vocatione Gentium, says, Sicut qui crediderunt juvantur ut in fide maneant; ita qui nondum crediderunt, juvantur ut credant: et quemadmodum illi in sua potestate habent, ut exeant; ita et isti in sua habent potestate ut veniant. That is, “As they that have believed are helped to abide in the faith; so they that have not yet believed are helped to believe; and as the former have it in their power to go out, so the latter have it in their power to come in.”
15. ARNOBIUS produces this objection of a heathen: “If the Saviour of mankind be come, as you say, why does he not save all?” and he answers it thus: — Patet omnibus fons vitæ, &c. That is, “The fountain of life is open to all, nor is any one deprived of the right of drinking: but if thy pride be so great that thou refusest the offered gift and benefits, &c, why dost thou blame him [Christ] who invites thee,” cujus solæ sunt hæ partes, ut sub tui juris arbitrio fructum suæ benignitatis exponat? (ARN. Contra Gentes, lib. 2,) “whose full part it is to submit the fruit of his bounty to a choice that depends upon thyself?”
16. PROSPER, although he was St. Augustine’s disciple, does justice to the truth which I maintain. For speaking of some that fell away from holiness to uncleanness, he says, Non ex eo necessitatem pereundi habuerunt quia predestinati non sunt; sed ideo prædestinati non sunt; quia tales futuri ex voluntaria prævaricatione præsciti sunt. (PROSP. Ad. Ob. iii, Gall.) That is, “They did not lie under a necessity of perishing because they were not elected [to a crown of life;] but they were not elected [to that reward] because they were foreknown to be such as they are by their voluntary iniquity.” The same father allows that it is absurd to believe a day of judgment, and to deny free will. Judicium futurum, says he, omnino non esset si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. (PROS. ad. obj. 10, Vinc.) That is, “By no means would there be a day of judgment, if men sinned by the will or decree of God.” The reason is plain, if we sinned through any necessity laid on us by “the will of God,” or by predestinating fate, we might say, like the heathen poet, Fati ista culpa est; nemo fit fato nocens: “It is the fault of fate: necessity excuses any one.”
17. FULGENTIUS, although he was also St. Augustine’s disciple, cuts up the doctrine of bound will by the root, where he says: — Nec justitia justa dicetur, si puniendum reum non invenisse, sed fecisse dicatur. Major vero injustitia, si lapso Deus retribuat pænam, quem stantem dicitur prædestinasse ad ruinam.” (FULG. 50. 1, ad Mon. cap. 22.) That is, “Justice could not be said to be just if it did not find, but made man an offender. And the injustice would be still greater, if God, after having predestinated a man to ruin when he stood, inflicted punishment upon him after his fall.”
18. If any of the fathers is a rigid bound willer, it is heated AUGUSTINE: nevertheless, in his cool moments, he grants as much free will as I contend for. Hear him: Nos quidem sub fato stellarum nullius hominis genesim ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel male vivitur, propter justum Dei judicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus. (AUG. 1, 2, contr. Faust. c. 5.) That is, “We place no man’s nativity under the fatal power of the stars, that we may assert the liberty of the will, whereby our actions are rendered either moral or immoral, and keep it free from every bond of necessity, on account of the righteous judgment of God.” Again: Nemo habet in potestate quid veniat in mentem; sed consentire vel dissentire propriæ voluntatis est. (AUG. De Litera et Spiritu, cap. 34.) That is, “Nobody can help what comes into his mind; but to consent or to dissent from involuntary suggestions, is the prerogative of our own will.” f45 Once more: Initium salutis nostræ a Deo miserante habemus; ut acquiescamus salutiferæ inspirationi, nostræ est potestatis. (De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis, cap. 21.) That is, “The beginning of our salvation flows from the merciful God; but it is in our power to consent to his saving inspiration.” And what he means by “having a thing in our power,” he explains in these words, Hoc quisque in sua potestate habere dicitur, quod si vult facit, si non vult non facit. (AUG. De Spir. et lit. c. 31.) That is, “Every one has that in his own power which he does if he will, and which he can forbear doing if he will not do it.”
Agreeable to this is that rational observation, which, I think, is St. Augustine’s, also: — Si non est liberum arbitrium, non est quod salvetur. Si non est gratia, non est unde salvetur: “If there be no free will, there is nothing to be saved: if there be no free grace, there is nothing whereby we may be saved:” a golden saying this, which is as weighty as my motto, “If you take away free grace, how does God save the world? And if you take away free will, how does he judge the world?”
So great is the force of truth, that the same prejudiced father, commenting upon this text, “Every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself,” 1 John 3:3, does not scruple to say: — “Behold after what manner he has not taken away free will, that the apostle should say, ‘keepeth himself pure.’ Who keepeth us pure, except God? But God keepeth thee not thus against thy will. Therefore inasmuch as thou joinest thy will to God, thou keepest thyself pure. Thou keepest thyself pure, not of thyself, but by him who comes to dwell in thee. Yet because in this thou dost something of thine own will, therefore is something also attributed to thee. Yet so it is ascribed to thee, that still thou mayest say, with the psalmist, ‘Lord, be thou my helper!’ If thou sayest, ‘Be thou my helper,’ thou dost something; for if thou dost nothing, how does he help?” Happy would it have been for the Church if St. Augustine had always done justice in this manner to the second, as well as to the first Gospel axiom! He would not have paved the way for free wrath, and Antinomian free grace. Nor could Mr. Wesley do more justice to both Gospel axioms than Augustine does in the following words: — Non illi debent sibi tribuere, qui venerunt, quia vocati venerunt: nec illi, qui noluerant venire, debuerant alteri tribuere, sed tantum sibi: quia ut venirent vocati in libera erat voluntate. (AUG. lib. 83, Quæstionum.) “They that came [to Christ] ought not to impute it to themselves, because they came, being called: and they that would not come, ought not to impute it to another, but only to themselves, because, when they were called, it was in the power of their free will to come.” Deus non deserit nisi desertus: “God forsakes no man, unless he be first forsaken.” (Quæst. 68.) Here is a right dividing of the word of truth! a giving God the glory of our salvation, without charging him with our destruction!
Nay, ST. JEROME and ST. AUGUSTINE, notwithstanding their warmth against Pelagius, have not only at times strongly maintained our remunerative election; but by not immediately securing the election of distinguishing grace, they have really granted him far more than I in conscience can do. Take the following instances of it: — ST. JEROME upon Galatians 1, says, Ex Dei præscientia evenit, ut quem scit justum futurum, prius diligat quam oriatur ex utero: “It is owing to God’s prescience that he loves those who he foresees will become just, before they come out of their mother’s womb.” Again, upon Malachi i, he says, Dilectio et odium Dei vel ex præscientia nascitur futurorum vel ex operibus: “God’s love and hatred spring from his foreknowledge of future events, or from our works.” Nay, in his very dispute with the Pelagians, (book iii,) he declares that God eligit quem bonum cernit, “chooses him whom he sees good:” which is entirely agreeable to this unguarded assertion of St. Augustine: — Nemo eligitur nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est, quia “elegit nos Deus ante mundi constitutionem,” non video quomodo sit dictum, nisi de præscientia fidei et operum pietatis. (AUG. Quæst. 2, ad Simplicianum.) That is, “Nobody is chosen but as he already differs from him that is rejected. Nor do I see how it can be said that “God has chosen us before the beginning of the world,” unless this be said with respect to God’s foreknowledge of our faith and works of piety.”
I call these assertions of St. Jerome and St. Augustine “unguarded,” because they so maintain the election of remunerative justice as to leave no room for the election of distinguishing grace, which I have maintained in my exposition of Romans ix, and Ephesians i: an election this, which the Pelagians overlook, and which St. Paul secures when he says that God chose Jacob to the privileges of the covenant of peculiarity,” before he had done any good, that the purpose of God according to the election [of superior grace] might stand not of works, but of [the superior kindness of] him that calleth:” an important election this, inconsistently given up by St. Augustine, when speaking of Jacob he says, in the above-quoted treatise, Non electus est ut fieret bonus, sed bonus factus eligi potuit: “He was not chosen that he might become good; but, being made good, he could be chosen.”
I shall close these quotations from the fathers, with one more from St. Irenæus, who was Polycarp’s disciple, and flourished immediately after the apostolic age: — Quoniam omnes ejusdem sunt naturæ, et potentes retinere et operari bonum, et potentes rursum amittere id, et non facere; juste apud homines sensatos, quanto magis apud Deum, alii quidem laudantur, et dignum percipiunt testimonium electionis bonæ, et perseverantiæ; alii vero accusantur, et dignum percipiunt darmnum eo quod justum et bonum reprobaverunt. (IREN. Adv. Hær. lib. iv, cap. 74.) That is, “Forasmuch as all men are of the same nature, having power to hold and to do that which is good, and having power again to lose it, and not to do what is right; before men of sense, (and how much more before God!) some are justly praised, and receive a worthy testimony, for making a good choice and persevering therein; while others are justly accused, and receive condign punishment, because they refused what is just and right.” If I am not mistaken, the preceding quotations prove, (1.) That the fathers in general pleaded for as much free will as we contend for.
(2.) That the two champions of the doctrines of grace, Prosper and Fulgentius, and their Predestinarian leader, St. Augustine, when they considered (justum Dei judicium) “the righteous judgment of God,” have (at times at least) maintained the doctrine of liberty as strongly as the rest of the fathers. And, (3.) That St. Augustine himself was so carried away once by the force of the arguments and scriptures which support the remunerative election of impartial justice, as rashly to give up the gratuitous election of distinguishing grace.
Should any of the above-mentioned fathers have contradicted himself, (as St. Augustine has done for one,) I hope I shall not be charged with “gross misrepresentations” for quoting them when they speak as the oracles of God. If at any time they deviate from that blessed rule, let them defend their deviations if they can; or let Zelotes and Honestus (who follow them when they go out of the way) do it for them. I repeat it, like a true Protestant, I rest the cause upon right reason and plain Scripture; and if I produce the sentiments of the fathers, it is merely to undeceive Zelotes, who thinks that all moderate free willers are Pelagian heretics, and that the fathers were as rigid bound willers as himself.
II. Proceed we to confirm the preceding quotations by the testimony of some modern divines.
1. Calvin says, Quasi adhuc integer staret homo, semper apud Latinos Liberi Arbitrii nomen extiTitus Grœcus vero non puduit multo arrogantius usurpare vocabulum. Siquidem autexousion dixerunt, acsi potestas sui ipsius penes hominem fuisset. (Inst. lib. 2, cap. 2, sec. 4.) “The Latin fathers have always retained the word FREE WILL, as if man stood yet upright. As for the Greek fathers, they have not been ashamed to make use of a much more arrogant expression; calling man autexousion, [free agent, or self manager:] just as if man had a power to govern himself.” This concession of Calvin decides the question. I need only observe that Calvin wrongs the fathers when he insinuates that they ascribed liberty to man, “as if man stood yet upright.” No: they attributed to man a natural liberty to evil, and a gracious blood-bought liberty to good. Thus, like our reformers, they maintained man’s free agency without derogating from God’s grace.
2. Bishop ANDREWS, a moderate Calvinist, says, “I dare not condemn the fathers, who almost all assert we are elected and predestinated according to faith foreseen; that the necessity of damnation is hypothetical, not absolute, &c. That God is ready and at hand to bestow and communicate his grace, &c. It is the fault of men themselves, that what is offered is not actually conferred: for grace is not wanting to us, but we are wanting to that.” And this he confirms, by this passage from St. Augustine: — “All men may turn themselves from the love of visible and temporal things to keep God’s commands, if they will; because that light [Christ] is the light of all mankind.”
3. The doctrine of free will stands or falls with the conditionality of the covenant of grace. Hence it is that all rigid bound willers abhor the word condition: nevertheless, Mr. Robert, a judicious Calvinist, sees the tide of the contrary doctrine so strong, that he says, in his Mystery of the Bible, “Sound writers, godly and learned, ancient and modern, foreign and domestic, do unanimously subscribe to the conditionality of the covenant of grace, in the sense before stated:” a sense this, which Bishop Davenant clearly expresses in these words: — “Peter, notwithstanding his predestination, might have been damned, if he had voluntarily continued in his impenitency.” And Judas, notwithstanding his reprobation, might have been saved, if he had not voluntarily continued in his impenitency. (Animadversions, p. 241.)
4. Dr. TUCKER observes, that although Vossius and Norris (who have each written a history of Pelagianism) differ in some points, yet they “agree that St. Augustine’s [Calvinian] positions were allowed by his warmest defenders at that very time to be little better than novelties, if compared with the writings of the most ancient fathers, especially of the Greek Church.” (Letter to Dr. Kippis, p. 79.)
5. EPISCOPIUS, in his answer to Capellus, p. 1, says, “Augustine, Prosper, and all the other divines of that age, [quin et priorum omnium seculorum Patres,] and the fathers of all the preceding ages, have not represented the grace of regeneration so special as to take away free will. On the contrary, they unanimously agree that the full effect of regenerating grace depends in some degree on man’s free will: insomuch that, this grace being imparted, the consent or dissent of the human will may follow. I say the consent or dissent, lest some people should think that I understand by free will nothing but a certain willingness.” The same learned author says, in his answer to Camero, chap. vi, “What is plainer than that the ancient divines, for three hundred years after Christ, those at least who flourished before St. Augustine, maintained the liberty of our will, or an indifference to two contrary things, free from all internal or external necessity! &c. Almost all the reformed divines confess it, when they are pressed by the authority of the fathers. Thus Melancthon on Romans 9, says, Scriptores veteres omnes, præter Augustinum, ponunt aliquam causam electionis in nobis esse.” That is, “All the ancient authors, except St. Augustine, allow that the cause of our election [to an eternal life of glory] is in some degree in ourselves.”
6. VOSSIUS, a divine perfectly acquainted with all the ancient Christian writers, says, in the sixth book of his Pelagian History, “The Greek fathers ALWAYS, and ALL the Latin fathers who lived before Augustine, are wont to say that those men are predestinated to life [eternal glory] whom God foresaw would live piously and well; or, as some others speak, whom God foresaw would believe and persevere, &c. Which they so interpret, that predestination unto glory is made according to God’s foreknowledge of faith and perseverance. But they did not mean the foreknowledge of such things, which a man was to do by the power of nature, but by the strength of prevenient and subsequent grace. Therefore this consent of antiquity is of no service to the Pelagians or semi-Pelagians, who both hold, that a reason of predestination, in all its effects, may be assigned from something in us. Whereas the orthodox f46 fathers acknowledge that the first grace [i.e. initial salvation] is not conferred of merit [or works] but freely. So that they thought no reason, from any thing in us, could be given of predestination to prevenient grace.”
7. Dr. DAVENANT, Bishop of Salisbury, and one of the English divines who were sent to the synod of Dort, (in his “Animadversions upon a treatise entitled, God’s love to all Mankind,” Cambridge edition, 1641, p. 48,) sets his seal to the preceding quotations in these words: — “The fathers, when they consider that the wills of men non-elected do commit all their evil acts freely, usually say that they had a power to have done the contrary.” And he himself espouses their sentiment: for speaking of Cain’s murder, Absalom’s incest, and Judas’ treason, he says, p. 253, “All these sinful actions, and the like, are committed by reprobates, out of their own free election, having a power whereby they might have abstained from committing them.” Again, p. 198, he says, “They [God’s decrees] leave the wills of men to as much liberty as the Divine prescience f47 does. And this is the general opinion of divines, though they differ about the manner of reconciling man’s liberty with God’s predestination.” Once more, p. 326, &c: “The decree of preterition neither taketh away any power of doing well, wherewith persons non-elected are endued, &c. Neither is it a decree binding God’s hands from giving them sufficient grace to do many good acts, which they wilfully refuse to do, &c. The non-elect have a power, or possibility to believe or repent at the preaching of the Gospel; which power might be reduced into act, if the voluntary frowardness and resistiveness of their own hearts were not the only hindering cause.” Page 72, the learned bishop grants again all that we contend for, in these words: — “In bad and wicked actions of the reprobate, their freedom of will is not vain; because thereby their consciences are convicted of their guiltiness and misdeserts, and God’s justice is cleared in their damnation. Neither is there any indeclinable or insuperable necessity domineering over free will, more than in the opinion of the remonstrants.” Once more, p. 177: “Predestination (says he) did not compel or necessitate Judas to betray and sell his Master, &c. The like may be said of all other sinners who commit such sins upon deliberation, and so proceed to election, [i.e. to choose evil;] having in themselves a natural power of understanding, whereby they were able otherwise to have deliberated, and thereupon otherwise to have chosen. And we see by experience that traitors and adulterers, fully bent to commit such wicked acts, can, and oftentimes do refrain putting them in practice upon better deliberation. This is a demonstration that they can choose the doing or the forbearing to do such wicked acts.”
From these quotations it appears that, when judicious and candid Calvinists have to do with judicious and learned remonstrants, they are obliged to turn moderate free willers, or fly in the face of the sacred writers, the fathers, and the best divines of their own persuasion.
Since the preceding pages were written, Providence has thrown in my way Dr. WHITBY’S Discourse on the points of doctrine which are balanced in the “Scripture Scales.” He highly deserves a place among the modern divines who confirm the contents of this section, concerning the antiquity of the doctrine of free will, evangelically connected with the doctrines of free grace and just wrath. I therefore produce here the following extract from his useful book, second edition, printed in London, 1735: — In the preface, p. 3, he says, with respect to the leading doctrines of election and reprobation, in which he entirely dissents from Calvin: “I found I still sailed with the stream of antiquity, seeing only one, St Augustine, with his two boatswains, Prosper and Fulgentius, tugging hard against it, and often driven back into it by the strong current of Scripture, reason, and common sense.” As a proof of this, the doctor produces, among many more, the following quotations from the fathers, which I transcribe only in English; referring those who wish to see the Greek or Latin to the doctor’s discourses, where the books, the pages, and the very words of the fathers are quoted: — Page 95, &c, Dr. Whitby says, “They [the fathers] unanimously declare that God hath left it in the power of man ‘to turn to vice or virtue,’ says Justin Martyr: ‘to choose or refuse faith and obedience, to believe or not, say Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and St. Cyprian: ‘that every one, &c, renders himself either righteous or disobedient,’ says Clemens of Alexandria: ‘that God hath left in our own power to turn to, or from good; to be good or bad, to do what is righteous or unrighteous:’ so Athanasius, Epiphanius, Macarius, St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Cyril of Alexandria: ‘that our happiness or punishment depends on our own choice; that it is our own choice to be a holy seed, or the contrary; to fall into hell, or enjoy the kingdom; to be children of the night or the day: by virtue to be God’s or by wickedness to be the devil’s children:’ so Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Chrysostom, and Gregory Nyssen: ‘that we are vessels of wrath, or of mercy, from our own choice, every one preparing himself to be a vessel of wrath from his own wicked inclination; or to be a vessel of Divine love by faith, because they have rendered themselves fit for [rewarding] mercy:’ so Origen, Macarius, Chrysostom, Æcumenius, and Theophylact.” Page 336, &c, the doctor has the following words and striking quotations: — “All these arguments [for the freedom of the will of man] are strongly confirmed by the concurrent suffrage, and the express and frequent declarations of the fathers. Thus Justin Martyr having told us that man would not be worthy of praise or recompense, ‘did he not choose good of himself, nor worthy of punishment for doing evil, if he did not this f48 of himself,’ says, ‘This the Holy Spirit hath taught us by Moses in these words, See, I have set before thee good and evil; choose the good.’ Clemens Alexandrinus says, ‘The prophecy of Isaiah saith, If you be willing, &c, demonstrating that both the choice and the refusal, (viz. of faith and experience, of which he there speaketh,) are in our own power.’ Tertullian pronounces them ‘unsound in the faith, corrupter, of the Christian discipline, and excusers of all sin, who so refer all things to the will of God, by saying, Nothing is done without his appointment, as that we cannot understand that any thing is left to ourselves to do.’ St. Cyprian proves, Credendi vel non credendi libertatem in arbitrio positam, ‘that to believe or not, is left to our own free choice,’ from Deuteronomy 30:19, and Isaiah 1:19. Theodoret, having cited these words of Christ, If any man thirst, let him come to me and drink, adds: ‘Ten thousand things of this nature may be found, both in the Gospels and other writings of the apostles, clearly manifesting the liberty and self election of the nature of man.’ St. Chrysostom speaks thus: — ‘God saith, If you will, and if you will not, giving us power, and putting it in our own option to be virtuous or vicious. The devil saith, Thou canst not avoid thy fate. God saith, I have put before thee fire and water, life and death, stretch forth thy hand to whether of them thou wilt. The devil says, It is not in thee to stretch forth thy hand to them.’ St. Austin proves, from those words of Christ, Make the tree good, &c, or make the tree evil (in nostra potestate situm esse mutare voluntatem,) ‘that it is put in our own power to change the will.’ It would be endless to transcribe all that the fathers say upon this head. Origen is also copious in this assertion: for having cited these words, And now, Israel, what does the Lord thy God require of thee? he adds: ‘Let them blush at these words, who deny that man has free will. How could God require that of man which he had not in his power to offer him?’ And again: ‘The soul,’ saith he, ‘does not incline to either part out of necessity, for then neither vice nor virtue could be ascribed to it; nor would its choice of virtue deserve reward; nor its declination to vice punishment. But the liberty of the will is preserved in all things, that it may incline to what it will; as it is written, Behold I have set before thee life and death.’ St. Augustine also, from many passages in which the Scripture saith, Do not so, or so; or do this, or that, lays down this general rule: that all such places sufficiently demonstrate the liberty of the will: and this he saith against them, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent liberum arbitrium, ‘who so assert the grace of God, as to deny the liberty of the will.’” Page 340. “They [the fathers] add, that all God’s commands and prohibitions, &c, would be vain and unreasonable, and all his punishments unjust, and his rewards groundless, if man, after the fall, had not still the liberty to do what is commanded, and forbear what is forbidden. For, saith St. Austin, ‘the Divine precepts would profit none, if they had not free will, by which they, doing them, might obtain the promised rewards, &c. These precepts cut off men’s excuse from ignorance,’ &c, But then, ‘because others,’ saith he, ‘accuse God of being wanting in giving them power to do good or inducing them to sin:’ against these men he cites that known passage of the son of Sirach, God left man in the hands of his counsel, if he would to keep the commandments, &c. And then cries out, ‘Behold, here, a very plain proof of the liberty of the human will! &c, for how does he command, if man hath not free will or power to obey? What do all God’s commands show, but the free will of man? For they would not be given, if man had not that freedom of will by which he could obey them.’ And therefore in his book, De Fide, against the Manichees, who denied that man had free will, and that it was in his power to do well or ill, he makes this an indication of their blindness: — ‘Who,’ saith he, ‘will not cry out that it is folly to command him who has not liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn him who has it not in his power to do what is required? And yet these miserable men [the Manichees] understand not that they ascribe this wickedness and injustice to God.’ Clemens of Alexandria declares ‘that neither praises nor reprehensions, rewards nor punishments are just, if the soul has not the power of choosing or abstaining: but evil is involuntary.’ Yea, he makes this ‘the very foundation of salvation, without which there could be neither any reasonable baptism, nor Divine ordering of our natures, because faith would not be in our own power.’ ‘The soul,’ says Origen, ‘acts by her own choice, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part she will: and therefore God’s judgment of her is just, because of her own accord she complies with good or bad monitors.’ ‘One of these two things is necessary,’ saith Epiphanius, ‘either that there should be no judgment, because men act not freely; or if laws be justly made by God, and punishments threatened to, and inflicted on the wicked, and God’s judgments be according to truth, there is no fate; for therefore is one punished for his sins, and another praised for his good works, because he has it in his power to sin or not.’ ‘For how,’ says Theodoret, ‘can he justly punish a nature [with endless torments] which had no power to do good, but was bound in the bonds of wickedness?’ And again: ‘God, having made the rational nature with power over its own actions, averts men from evil things, and provokes them to do what is good by laws and exhortations, but he does not necessitate the unwilling to embrace what is better, that he may not overturn the bounds of nature.’ Innumerable are the passages of this nature, which might be cited from the fathers.”
Page 361, &c, the doctor produces again many quotations from the fathers, in defence of liberty. Take some of them: “Justin Martyr argues: ‘If man has not power by his free choice to avoid evil, and to choose the good, he is unblamable, whatsoever he does.’ Origen, in his Dissertation against Fate, declares ‘that the asserters of it do free men from all fault; and cast the blame of all the evil that is done upon God.’ Eusebius declares ‘that this opinion absolves sinners, as doing nothing on their own accord which was evil; and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world upon God and upon his providence.’ ‘That men lie under no necessity from God’s foreknowledge [which was of old the chief argument of the fatalists, espoused of late by Mr. Hobbes, and is still made the refuge of the Predestinarians] may be thus proved,’ saith Origen, ‘because the prophets are exhorted in the Scripture to call men to repentance, and to do this in such words, as if it were unknown whether they would turn to God, or would continue in their sins; as in those words of Jeremiah, Perhaps they will hear, and turn every man from his evil way: and this is said, not that God understood not whether they would do this or not, but to demonstrate the almost equal balance of their power so to do, and that they might not despond, or remit of their endeavours by an imagination that God’s foreknowledge laid a necessity upon them, as not leaving it in their power to turn, and so was the cause of their sin.’ ‘If men,’ says Chrysostom, ‘do pardon their fellow men, when they are necessitated to do a thing, much more should this be done to men compelled by fate [or by decrees] to do what they do; for if it be absurd to punish them, who by the force of barbarians are compelled to any action, it must be more so to punish him who is compelled by a stronger power.’ ‘If fate be established,’ says Eusebius, ‘philosophy and piety are overthrown.’”
Page 364, the doctor adds: — “Though there is in the rational soul a power to do evil, ‘it is not evil on that account,’ saith Didymus Alexandrinus, ‘but because she will freely use that power; and this is not only ours, but the opinion of all who speak orthodoxly of rational beings.’ St. Augustine lays down this as the true definition of sin: — ‘Sin is the will to obtain or retain that which justice forbids, and from which it is free for us to abstain.’ Whence he concludes ‘that no man is worthy of dispraise or punishment, for not doing that which he has not power to do; and that if sin be worthy of dispraise and punishment, it is not to be doubted, (tunc esse peccatum cum et liberum est nolle) that our choice is sin, when we are free not to make that choice.’ ‘These things,’ saith he, ‘the shepherds sing upon the mountains, and the poets in the theatres, and the unlearned in their assemblies, and the learned in the libraries, and the doctors in the schools, and the bishops in the churches, and mankind throughout the whole earth.’”
I conclude this extract by accounting for St. Augustine’s inconsistency. He was a warm man: and such men, when they write much, and do not yet firmly stand upon the line of moderation, are apt to contradict themselves, as often as they use the armour of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, to oppose contrary errors. Hence it is, that when St. Augustine opposed the Manichees, who were rigid bound willers, he strongly maintained free will with Pelagius; and when he opposed the Pelagians, who were rigid free willers, he strongly maintained bound will and necessity with Manes. The Scripture doctrine of free will lies between the error of Pelagius and that of Manes. The middle way between these extremes is, I hope, clearly pointed out in section 20. Upon the whole, he must be perverse who can cast his eyes upon the numerous quotations which Dr. Whitby has produced, and deny that the fathers held the doctrine of the Scripture Scales with respect to free will; and that, if they leaned to one extreme, it was rather to that of the Pelagians, than to that of the rigid bound willers, who clothe their favourite doctrine of necessity with the specious names of invincible fate, irrevocable decrees, or absolute predestination.
III. Zelotes endeavours to hide his error under the wings of the Church of England, as well as behind the authority of the fathers, but with as little success. I design to show his mistake in this respect, in an “Essay on the Seventeenth Article.” In the meantime I shall observe, that a few years before Archbishop Cranmer drew up our “articles of religion,” he helped the other reformers to compose a book called, “The Necessary Doctrine of a Christian Man,” and added to it a section upon free will, in which free will is defined “a power of the will joined with reason, whereby a reasonable creature, without constraint, in things of reason, discerneth and willeth good and evil; but chooseth good by the assistance of God’s grace, and evil of itself.” “Wherefore,” adds Cranmer, “men be to be warned, that they do not impute to God their vice or their damnation, but to themselves, which by free will have abused the grace and benefits of God. All men be also to be monished, and chiefly preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, [i.e. regarding both Gospel axioms] so attemper and moderate themselves, that neither they so preach the grace of God [with Zelotes] that they take away thereby free will; nor, on the other side, so extol free will [with Honestus] that injury be done to the grace of God.” I grant that in the book, from which this quotation f49 is taken, there are some errors which Cranmer afterward renounced, as he had done absolute predestination before. But that he never varied from the doctrine of free will laid down in the above-mentioned passage, is evident from the tenor of our articles of religion, which he penned, and which contain exactly the doctrine of the above-quoted lines.
Hear him and the Church of England publicly maintaining free grace and free will. In the tenth article on free will they assert, that “we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God, by Christ preventing [i.e. first visiting] us, that we may have a good will.” Let the article be thrown into the scales, and the judicious reader will easily see that it directly or indirectly guards the very doctrine which the fathers maintained, and which we defend, No. 1, against Honestus, and No. 2, against Zelotes.
I.
“The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength, &c, to faith and calling upon God.”
“Wherefore we have no power to do good works, &c, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, [i.e. visiting us first,] that we may have a good will, and working with, [not without] us, when we have that good will.”
II.
The condition of man after the fall of Adam (and the promise made to him) is such, that he can turn and prepare himself to faith and calling upon God, although not by his own natural strength.
Wherefore we have a power to do good works, &c, through the grace of God by Christ preventing us, (i.e. visiting us first,) that we may have a good will, and working with, (not without us,) when we have that good will.
Who does not see that there is not the least disagreement between these balanced propositions? And that, when Zelotes produces the tenth article of the Church f50 to prove us heretics, he acts as unreasonable a part as if he produced John 15:5, to show that St. Paul was not orthodox when he wrote Philippians 4:13.
I.
Without me [Christ] ye can do nothing, John 15:5.
II.
I [Paul] can do all things through Christ strengthening me, Philippians 4:13.
This supposed “heresy” runs, through our Common Prayer Book. Take one or two instances of it. In her catechism, she teaches every child whom she nurses, to “thank God for calling him to this state of salvation,” i.e. to a state of initial salvation according to the Christian covenant. She informs him that “his duty is to love God with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself,” &c, and then she adds: — “My good child, know this, that thou art not able to do these things of thyself, nor to walk in the commandments of God without his special grace, which thou must learn at all times to call for by diligent prayer,” &c. Now every child, whose mind is not yet tainted with Calvinism, understands the language of our holy mother according to the doctrine of the Scales, thus: — I.
Of myself I am not able to love God with all my heart, &c. I am not able to walk in the commandments of God without his special grace.
I am in a state of initial grace, and I heartily thank our heavenly Father that he has called me to this state of salvation.
II.
By God’s special grace I am able to love him with all my heart, &c. I am able to walk in the commandments of God with his special grace, “and, by God’s grace, so I will.”
To have God’s special grace, “I must learn at all times to call for it by diligent prayer,” according to the help afforded me in my state of initial salvation.
This doctrine of free grace and free will runs also through the collects of our Church. Read one of those which Zelotes admires most: — “Grant to us, Lord, we beseech thee, the spirit, [i.e. the special grace,] to think and do always such things as be rightful; that we who cannot do any thing that is good without thee, may by thee be enabled to live according to thy will, through Jesus Christ our Lord.” (Ninth Sunday after Trinity.) Divide the doctrine of this collect according to the two Gospel axioms, and you will have the following balanced propositions: — I.
We cannot do any thing that is good without thee, or thy Spirit.
We cannot, but by thee, live according to thy will, &c. II.
By thee, or thy Spirit, we can think and do alway such things as be rightful.
By thee we can live according to thy will, &c. To bring more proofs that this is the doctrine of the Church of England, would be to offer an insult to the attention of her children. Nor can her sentiments on free will be more dearly expressed than they are in these words of the martyred prelate who drew up her articles: — “It pleaseth the high wisdom of God, that man prevented [i.e. first visited] by his grace, which, being offered man, he may if he will refuse or receive, be also a worker by his free consent and obedience to the same, &c, and by God’s grace and help shall walk in such works as be requisite to his [continued f51 and final] justification.” (Necess. Doct.)
However, lest Zelotes should object to my quoting “the Necessary Doctrine of a Christian Man,” I substitute for the preceding quotation, one to which he has indirectly subscribed, in subscribing to the thirty-fifth article of our Church: — “Cast we off all malice, and all evil will; for this spirit will never enter into an evil-willing soul [to bring there his special grace.] Let us cast away all the whole lump of sin that standeth about us, for he will never dwell in a body that is subdued to sin, &c. If we do our endeavour, we shall not need to fear. We shall be able to overcome all our enemies, &c. Only let us apply ourselves to accept the grace that is offered us. Of Almighty God we have comfort by his goodness; of our Saviour Christ’s mediation we may be sure; and this Holy Spirit will suggest unto us that which shall be wholesome, and comfort us in all things.” (Homily for Rog. Week, part 3.) How strongly are the doctrines of free grace and free will guarded in these lines! And who does not see that our articles, liturgy, and homilies agree to maintain the Gospel marriage of free grace and free will, as well as Mr. Wesley, Mr. Sellon, and myself? The preceding quotations and remarks will, I hope, convince the impartial reader, that (some few unguarded expressions being excepted) Zelotes might as well screen his doctrines of narrow grace, bound will, and free wrath, behind the Scripture Scales, as defend them by the authority of the primitive Church, and the Church of England.
IV. Should Zelotes think to answer the contents of this section by saying that my doctrine is “rank Pelagianism:” I reply, 1. That Vossius, who wrote the history of Pelagianism, entirely clears our doctrine of the charge of both Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism, as appears by the passage which I have quoted from him, page 209: and in this cause the name of Vossius is legion.
2. PROSPER, in his letter to St. Augustine, gives us this account of the principles of the Pelagians: — Prior est hominis obedientia quam Dei gratia. Initium salutis ex eo est qui salvatur, non ex eo qui salvat. “Man’s obedience is beforehand with God’s grace. The beginning of salvation is from him that is saved, and not from him that saves.” These two propositions are greatly Pharisaic and detestable: they set aside the first Gospel axiom; and, far from recommending them, I every where oppose to them the weights of my first Scale. It would not then be more ridiculous to charge me with Crispianity, than it is to accuse me of Pelagianism.
3. Bishop Davenant, in his “Animadversions,” (pages 14 and 15,) calls Faustus Rhegiensis “one of the ancient semi-Pelagians,” and lays down his doctrine in the five following anti-Calvinistic propositions, in which reigns a confusion equal to that of Calvinism:
(1.) Salus hominis non in prædestinatione factoris, sed in operatione famulantis collocata est: “Man’s salvation is not placed in the election of the Creator, but in the actions of the worker.” This is absolutely false with respect to the election of distinguishing grace. What had the Ephesians wrought to deserve to be elected and called to share the blessings of the Gospel of Christ, which St. Paul calls “so great salvation?” Who can make appear that they merited so great a favour better than the Hottentots?
(2.) Non est specialis circa credentes Dei munificentia: “God shows no special grace and favour to believers.” This is absolutely false also with respect to all Jewish and Christian believers, to whom he gives that grace, and those talents, which he does not bestow upon the heathens who “fear God and work righteousness.”
(3.) Prædestinatio adjustitiam pertinet: “Election belongs to justice.” This also is absolutely false, if it be understood of the election of distinguishing grace, whereby a man receives one, two, or five talents to trade with before he has done any thing. And it is partly false if it be understood of our election to receive rewards of grace and glory: for that election belongs to rich mercy as well as to distributive justice; it being God’s mercy in Christ, which engaged him to promise penitent, obedient believers rewards of grace and glory, (4.) Nisi præscientia exploraverit, predestinatio nihil decernit: “Predestination appoints nothing, unless prescience has seen a cause for the appointment.” This is false also, if this cause is supposed to be always in us. What foreseen excellence made God predestinate the posterity of Jacob to the old covenant of peculiarity rather than the offspring of Esau? And what reason can Honestus assign for his being called to read the Bible in a church, and not the Koran in a mosque?
(5.) Justitia periclitabitur, si sine merito indignus eligitur: “Justice will be in danger, if an undeserving person is chosen without any worthiness.” This is true with regard to the remunerative election of obedient believers to crowns of glory in the Church triumphant. Therefore, when Christ speaks of that election, he says, “They shall walk with him in white, for they are worthy:” but it is absolutely false with respect to the election of distinguishing grace, whereby the English and Scotch are chosen to the blessings of Christianity, rather than the Turks and Cannibals. I may therefore conclude that, according to the accounts which Vossius, Prosper, and Bishop Davenant give us of Pelagianism and ancient semi-Pelagianism, our doctrine is just as far from those erroneous systems, as it is from fatalism and Calvinism.