Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2.

A view of the sources whence the philosophers of the age draw their popular arguments against the catholic faith.

THE royal academy of Paris having offered a prize to the man who should write the best copy of verses upon the Divine nature, many wrote largely on the awful subject; but Professor Crousaz sent only two lines, of which this is the sense; “Cease to expect from man a proper description of the Supreme Being: none can speak properly of him but himself.” And the judicious academicians agreed to crown this short performance, because it gave the most exalted idea of him whose dazzling glory calls for our silent adoration, and forbids the curious disquisitions of our philosophical pride. “Canst thou, by searching, find out God?” says he in Job: “this knowledge is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? It is broader than the sea, it is deeper than hell: what canst thou know?” Job 11:7. ‘As the heavens are higher than the earth,” saith the Lord, “so are my thoughts [much more my nature] above your thoughts,” Isaiah 55:9. it is therefore one of the loudest dictates of reason, that, as we cannot grasp the universe with our hands, so we cannot comprehend the Maker of the universe with our thoughts.

Nevertheless, a set of men who make much ado about reason, after they have candidly acknowledged their ignorance with regard to the Divine nature, are so inconsistent as to limit God, and to insinuate that he can exist only according to their shallow, dark, and short-sighted ideas. Hence it is, that, if he speak of his essence otherwise than they have conceived it to be, they either reject his revelation, or so wrest and distort it as to force it to speak their pre-conceived notions, in direct opposition to the plain meaning of the words, to the general tenor of the Scriptures, to the consent of the catholic Church in all ages, and to the very form of their own baptism.

Is not the learned Dr. Priestley a striking instance of this unphilosophical conduct? Great philosopher in natural things, does he not forget himself in things Divine? Candid reader, to your unprejudiced reason we make our appeal. With a wisdom worthy of a Christian sage, he speaks thus in his Disquisitions on matter and spirit: “Of the substance of the Deity we have no idea at all; and, therefore, all that we can conceive or pronounce, concerning it, must be merely hypothetical.” (pp. 109, 110.) But has he behaved consistently with this reasonable acknowledgment? And may we not, upon his just concessions, raise the following query? When a doctor has granted that we have no idea at all of the Divine substance, &c, is he not both inconsistent and unreasonable, if, so far from pronouncing hypothetically concerning it, he absolutely declares that the Divine substance, of which he has no idea at all, is incompatible with the three Divine subsistences which the Scriptures call the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost?

But Dr. Priestley, after having granted the former proposition in his Disquisitions, absolutely pronounces the latter in his Corruptions, &c. Is not, therefore, Dr. Priestley both inconsistent and unreasonable? We truly honour him for his parts, and sincerely love him for his many social virtues; but if he continually attack our Saviour’s Divine glory, (which is dearer to us than life itself) he is too candid to refuse us the liberty of trying to defeat his attacks by plainly pointing out the flaw of his arguments, and the errors of his polemical conduct.

The learned doctor, continuing to speak as a true philosopher, says, “We know there must be a first cause, because things do actually exist, and could never have existed without a cause, and all secondary causes necessarily lead us to a primary one. But of the nature of the existence of this primary cause, concerning which we know nothing but by its effects, we cannot have any conception. We are absolutely confounded, bewildered, and lost, when we attempt to speculate concerning it. This speculation is attended with insuperable difficulties. Every description of the Divine Being in the New Testament gives us an idea of something filling and penetrating all things, and therefore of no known mode of existence.” (Disquisitions, pp. 111, 146.)

Upon these second concessions we raise this second argument: a doctor who grants that we know nothing of the first cause but by its effects; that we have no conception of its nature, that it has no known mode of existence, and that this speculation is attended with insuperable difficulties, must have an uncommon share of assurance or inattention, if he pretend to argue the catholic Church out of the belief of the trinity, because we have no (clear) conception of its nature, because it has no known mode of existence, and because (in our present state) the speculation of it is attended with some insuperable difficulties.

But Dr. Priestley has made all these fair concessions in his Disquisitions, and yet he pretends to argue us out of our faith in the trinity, because we have no clear conception of its nature, &c. Hath not, therefore, the doctor an uncommon share of assurance, or of inattention?

Continuing to speak like a Christian philosopher, he says, “In two circumstances that we do know, and probably in many others of which we have no knowledge at all, the human and Divine nature, finite and infinite intelligence, most essentially differ. The first is, that our attention is necessarily confined to one thing, whereas he who made, and continually supports all things, must equally attend to all things at the same time; which is a most astonishing but necessary attribute of the one supreme God, of which we can form no conception, and consequently, in this respect, no finite mind can be compared with the Divine. Again: the Deity not only attends to every thing, but must be capable of either producing or annihilating any thing: so that in this respect also the Divine nature must be essentially different from ours.” (p. 106.) “There is, therefore, upon the whole, manifold reason to conclude, that the Divine nature, or essence, beside being simply unknown to us, has properties most essentially different from every thing else.” (p. 107.) “God is, and ever must remain, the incomprehensible.” (p. 108.)

Upon this set of unavoidable concessions, made by Dr. Priestley, we raise this third argument: a philosopher who grants that God is the incomprehensible, that the human and Divine nature (of consequence human and Divine personality) most essentially differ—and that the Divine essence has properties most essentially different from every thing else: a philosopher, I say, who publicly grants this, must be one of the most prejudiced of all men if he reject the sacred trinity, into whose name he was baptized, because the trinity is in some sense incomprehensible, and because he insists that three Divine persons must be divided and separated like three human persons; just as if he did not himself maintain that the Divine essence, or personality, hath properties most essentially different from men, angels, and every thing else.

We could fill several pages with arguments equally demonstrative of the inconsistency and irrationality of the learned doctor’s attacks upon the catholic faith: but, not to tire out the leader’s patience in the second chapter of this work, we shall produce but one more set of the philosophical concessions of which Dr. Priestley loses sight in his theological works.

“In the first place,” says he, “it must be confessed, with awful reverence, that we know but little of ourselves, and therefore much less of our Maker, even with respect to his attributes. We know but little of the works of God, and therefore certainly much less of his essence. In fact, we have no proper idea of any essence whatever. It will hardly be pretended, that we have any proper idea of the substance even of matter, considered as divested of all its properties.” (Disquisitions, pp: 103 and 104.)

From these last concessions, and from the tenor of Dr. Priestley’s Corruptions, it appears, that men who confess they know little of God’s works, and much less of his essence; and who have not even any proper idea of the essence of a straw, pretend, nevertheless, to know clearly what is consistent with the Divine essence; insomuch, that setting up as reformers of the three creeds, they try to turn the doctrine of the trinity out of the Church, and the Lamb of God out of his Divine and everlasting throne.

Now is not this as absurd as if they said to the catholics, we have indeed been all baptized in the name of the God of the Christians, that is, “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:” but we new Gnostics, we modern reformers, who know nothing of the Father’s essence, nor even of the essence of an insect—we are, nevertheless, so perfectly acquainted with the Divine essence as to decide that it is absolutely inconsistent with the nature of the Father, to have a living Word, of a proper Son, and a rational Spirit; and, therefore, reforming our God himself, we strike the Word and the Holy Ghost out of the number of the Divine persons, whom at our baptism we vowed to serve jointly for ever. O ye philosophers of the age, can men of sense admire your philosophy any more than men of faith admire your orthodoxy? May we not hope, that when the blunders of your logic are brought to light, they will be a proper antidote for the poison of your errors? And will your admirers be still so inattentive, as not to see, that your capital objections against the trinity are sufficiently answered by applying to them the short reply you make on another occasion: “This is an argument, which derives all its force from our ignorance?” (See Disquisitions, p. 82.)

But if the philosophers, who attack the catholic faith, cannot overthrow the doctrine of the trinity by the arguments they draw from their avowed ignorance of the Divine nature, they seem determined to make us give up the point by arguments drawn from fear and from shame. Availing himself of our dread of Popery, and of our contempt for the Popish error of transubstantiation, the learned doctor loses no opportunity to compare that pretended mystery, that despicable absurdity, with the awful mystery of the trinity; exhorting us to reject them both, as equally contrary to reason and common sense. Thus, in his Appeal to the Professors of Christianity, speaking of the divinity of Christ, he says, “The prevalence of so impious a doctrine can be ascribed to nothing but that mystery of iniquity which began to work in the times of the apostles themselves. This, among other shocking corruptions of Christianity, grew up with the system of Popery. After exalting a man into a God, a creature into a Creator, men made a piece of bread into one also, and then bowed down to, and worshipped the work of their own hands.” And in the Preface to his Disquisitions, he writes, “Most Protestants will avow they have made up their minds with respect to the Popish doctrine of transubstantiation, so as to be justified in refusing even to lose their time in reading what may be addressed to them on it; and I avow it with respect to the doctrine of the trinity.” As these comparisons are the second store house, whence the learned doctor draws his arguments against our supposed idolatry, it is proper to show the unreasonableness of his method. For this, three remarks will, I hope, be sufficient.

1. The question between Dr. Priestley and us is, Whether there are three Divine subsistences in the one Divine essence? Now it is plain, that to deny this proposition, as reasonably as we deny that bread is flesh, and that wine is human blood, we must be as well acquainted with the nature of the Divine essence, and of Divine personality, as we are with the taste of bread and wine. But how widely different is the case, the doctor himself being judge! Do not his Disquisitions assert, that “the Divine essence hath properties most essentially different from every thing else,—that of God’s substance we have no idea at all—and that he must for ever remain the incomprehensible?” Therefore, if God hath revealed, that he exists with the three personal distinctions of Father, Word, and Holy Ghost, the learned doctor, after his concessions, can never deny it, without exposing at once his piety, his philosophy, his logic, and his common sense; unless he should make it appear, that he is the first man who can pertinently speak of what he has no idea at all, and who perfectly comprehends what must for ever remain incomprehensible. But,

2. The question between the popes and us, with respect to transubstantiation, is quite within our reach; since it is only whether bread be flesh and bones; whether wine be human blood; whether the same identical body can be wholly in heaven, and in a million of places on earth, at the same time; and whether a thin round wafer, an inch in diameter is the real person of a man five or six feet high. Here we only decide about things known to us from the cradle, and concerning which our experience, and our five senses, help us to form a right judgment, agreeable to the tenor of the Scriptures. Therefore,

3. Considering that the two cases are diametrically contrary, and differ as much as the depths of the Divine nature differ from a piece of bread; as much as the most incomprehensible thing in heaven differs from the things we know best upon earth,—we are bold to say, that, when the learned doctor involves the Protestant worshippers of the trinity, and the Popish worshippers of a bit of bread, in the same charge of absurd idolatry, he betrays as great a degree of unphilosophical prejudice, and illogical reasoning, as ever a learned and wise man was driven to in the height of a disputation for a favourite error.

“Do what you can,” replies the learned doctor, “you must either sacrifice the unity to the trinity, or the trinity to the unity; for they are incompatible.” But who says it? Certainly not our Lord who commands all nations to be baptized into the one name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; and if Dr. Priestley say it, then he says it without knowing it; for, speaking like a judicious philosopher, he has just told us, that “probably the Divine nature, beside being simply unknown to us, more essentially differs from the human in many circumstances of which we have no knowledge at all.” To this sufficient answer we beg leave to add an illustration which may throw some light upon the doctor’s unphilosophical positiveness.

Modern physicians justly maintain the circulation of the blood, which being carried from the heart through the arteries, flows back to it by the veins. But a learned doctor, very fond of unity, availing himself of the connection which the arteries have with the veins in all the extremities of the body, insists that one set of vessels is more agreeable to the simplicity of the human frame. What! says he, arteries! veins! and lymphatic vessels too! I pronounce that one set of uniform, circular vessels is quite sufficient. You must, therefore, sacrifice the arteries to the veins, or the veins to the arteries; for they are quite incompatible. This dogmatical positiveness of the Unitarian anatomist would surprise us the more, if we had just heard him say that there are many things in anatomy of which he has no knowledge at all, and assert that the minute ramifications, and delicate connections of the vessels which compose the human frame are, and must for ever remain incomprehensible to those who have such feeble, and imperfect organs.

From this simile, which, we hope, is not improper, we infer, that if positiveness on this anatomical question would not become the learning and modesty of a doctor in physic, a like degree of peremptoriness and assurance, in a matter infinitely more out of our reach, is as unsuitable to the humble candour of a doctor in divinity, and to the cautious wisdom of a philosopher.

Having thus taken a general view of the principal sources whence the philosophers of the age draw their popular arguments against the catholic faith: and having, we hope, by this means removed some prejudices out of the way, the cautious reader will more candidly consider the main question which is proposed in the next chapter.