Thoughts on Fanaticism.

THOUGHTS ON FANATICISM.

Translated From The French Of The Rev. John Fletcher.

By Miles Martindale.

FANATICISM is the child of false zeal and of superstition, the father of intolerance, and of persecution; it is therefore very different from piety, though some persons are pleased to confound them. The pious man, always governed by humility and reason, implores and receives the succours of grace; and evidences this Divine nature by conducting himself with sweet humility and love, the genuine character of the first Christians. But the fanatic, big with pride, and full of himself, rejects reason, and takes the emotions of his own passions for those of grace; and far from conducting himself with Christian modesty and love, he follows the reveries of his imagination as if they were the inspirations of the Divine Spirit; he imitates the follies of enthusiastic fools, and, if occasion offers, the cruelties of bloody persecutors. Let us cautiously guard against this excess, but let us not despise true zeal; for it differs as much from fanaticism as vigour, accompanied with health, differs from a delirium produced by a burning fever.

While certain philosophers, and some proud of following them, fall into this error, and agree to treat as fanatics not only the falsely inspired, but also those who believe in the Divine assistance which holy souls receive from GOD; they rank with enthusiasts all who humbly request from the Father of lights that inspiration which the Scriptures call the “wisdom which cometh from above;” or the assistance of the Holy Spirit. This philosophy, so common and so dangerous, has its source in pride; and from pride there are but three steps to Atheism. The first is to think one’s self sufficiently wise, independent, and strong, to govern the heart virtuously, without the Divine succours of the Father of lights. Those who take this step, filled with the lofty ideas they have of their own reason, despise, in some sense, this faculty of their soul, and take the twinkling light of their own imagination for the Sun of righteousness, from whom proceeds our supreme illumination. This step conducts to a second, which is not less dangerous. It is very natural for those who deny the influence of the Supreme Being on their spirits, to exclude him from all influence over their bodies, and all events. Hence it follows, that the gentlemen who are so ready to treat piety as enthusiasm, more or less follow Epicurus, who denied the influences of a Divine Providence over the preservation of our bodies, and the direction of all events. When these two steps are fully secured, the third is easily taken: for if God take no care, neither of our souls by his Spirit, nor of our bodies lay his providence, he is to us a useless Being, far from being God, that is to say, the “Being of beings,” the Being in whom we have life and motion; and our faith is reduced to that of Epicurus, or Spinosa, who neither admitted a God of grace nor of providence.

If the reader be of the sect of these philosophers, or inclined to their system, he will doubtless judge the author an enthusiast, because that, under the articles of air and zephyr,f18 he alludes to this common inspiration of the Divine Spirit, which is called the “grace of God;” for inspiration is as necessary to piety, or the spiritual life, as respiration is necessary to the animal life. If I am mistaken in this matter there is at least this consolation, that not only all the sacred authors are on my side, with the compilers of Christian liturgies, but also the wisest of the heathens. Let us observe some of the well known and fine testimonies of the ancient philosophers, which ought to put our modern philosophers to the blush, and even some of our divines. “Without God, (says Seneca,) there is no good man; it is he who inspires with grand ideas and exalted designs. God dwells in every good man. When you see a man superior to his passions, happy in adversity, calm amid surrounding tempests; can you withhold respect from him? Do you not say, These qualities are too exalted to derive their origin from this little ornamented individual. A Divine vigour has descended on him. A heavenly power animates an humble and excellent soul. There is no possessing these great advantages without the succours of the Supreme Being.” (Sen. Ep. 41.)

Bias gave this precept to his disciples: “Remember that all the good you do comes principally from the gods.” “Rome and Greece (says Cicero) have produced great men; and we ought to believe that none of them became such, but by the assistance of God. There never was a great man without some degree of Divine inspiration.” (Cic de Nat. Deorum. chap. 66.) And in the thirty - first chapter: “If there be (says he) among men good faith, virtue, and concord; from whence, think you, do these arrive on earth, if not from heaven?”

One might even here quote M. de Voltaire, who, in one of his happy moments, where he recommends truth, cites with admiration this fine passage of Confucius: - “Heaven hath given me virtue, man cannot hurt me;” and the verse of ancient Orpheus, which the priests of Ceres recited to those who were initiated into their mysteries: “Walk in the path of righteousness, adore the Master of the universe: he is one: all beings owe their existence to him; he acts IN them and BY them.” Now if God acts in beings in general, where is the absurdity of believing that he acts in a virtuous man, whose soul is the most noble instrument of the Father of spirits, as she is a temple the most worthy of the divinity? The ancient philosophers did not only acknowledge that moral virtues came principally from God, but also inventions that were useful to society. “They are the gift of the gods,” saith Pliny, “and if any one imagines that man made these discoveries by chance, he makes ungrateful returns for the presents of the divinity.” (Plin. lib. 27, chap. 1:2.)

Can we see these clear testimonies rendered to the truth of the doctrine which our philosophers would make to pass for fanaticism, without being astonished at the blindness of these people, who, aided by the Gospel, cannot discern that which the Pagans saw, but turn into ridicule truths clearly developed in the Holy Scriptures truths which the Pagan philosophers acknowledged many ages since? Plutarch, in his life of Coriolanus, goes still farther than the Roman philosophers; for, speaking of “actions extraordinary and dangerous, which demand a degree of inspiration and enthusiasm,” he cites several passages from Homer, where the poet speaks of such an inspiration; and, far from thinking with our philosophers that it is impossible and unreasonable, he says that “only ignorant and stupid people ridiculed it.” As a true philosopher he defends it, and proves that it harmonizes with our liberty. His words are remarkable. I will quote them from the translation of M. Dacier: - “God,” says he, “is so far from destroying our free agency, that he not only inspires us with a will, but he warms the imagination, and imparts ideas by which we are determined. It is thus he gives birth to the will, to which he adds confidence and hope. Indeed, we must either exclude God from having any part as to the moving cause and principle of our operations, or confess that there is no other way to succour men and co - operate with them. For he does not move our bodies, but by certain ideas which he awakens in us he excites our souls to active virtue; thus giving us a will, and restraining or turning it from evil.” (Lives of Illustrious Men. Ed. de Paris, 1762, tom. 3. p. 315.)

It appears, in Plutarch’s judgment, that to deny this kind of inspiration is to deny the providence of God, with regard to men; it is to plunge one’s self, at the same time, in the impious error of Epicurus, and the blindness of ignorant and stupid persons.

When a Pagan philosopher thus pleads the cause of Divine grace, can we, without indignation, behold Christians making a mock of the succours of the Spirit of God, by which only we can have that faith which enables us to say with certainty that “Jesus Christ is the Lord?” 1 Corinthians 12:3. Full of aversion for true Christianity, these admirers of a false philosophy will not, perhaps, permit true Christians what they allow to Voltaire, in the prayer which concludes his poem on the “Law of Nature:” “O God, unknown! O God, whom all declare! My heart would wander, if not filled with thee.” They think all to be enthusiasts who dare speak of inspiration as openly as M. Rousseau, their inconsistent oracle: “The divinity,” says he, “is seen in his works; he makes himself felt within us; he has given us that degree of sensibility which is known and felt.” He is not afraid to say in his confession of faith which he has made in his famous Emilius: “How can I be guilty for serving God according to the light which he imparts to my mind, and according to the sentiments with which he inspires my heart?” Some Christians, more inconsistent even than Rousseau, have not the candour to say, If God sometimes inspires with good sentiments even those who fight against the Gospel, he certainly can inspire those who receive it. There is perhaps no difficulty in drawing another comparison between the Pagan and our modern philosophers. After having seen how much they differ in regard to grace, let us see how widely they differ concerning prayer.

If man cannot conquer all his passions, and produce solid virtue in his heart, without the help of the Spirit of God, he ought with humility and ardour to implore that assistance. This is the foundation and reason of prayer. Some modern philosophers, at the head of whom is Rousseau, imagine that man has no need of Divine succours to render him virtuous. According to him, we are sufficient of ourselves. By setting our reason against our passions, she will make a complete conquest, and our will shall have the sole honour of the victory. See a little how he expresses himself on this head in his Emilius: “I bless God for his gifts; but I will not pray. What should I demand of him? Will he for me change the course of things? &c. No. Such a presumptuous petition is more deserving of punishment than an answer. I will not solicit from him the power to do well. Why should I ask of him what he hath already given me? &c. He requires me to change my will. It is he demands - demands from me. It is the will which makes my work.” This reasoning of the philosopher of Geneva amounts, it I am not mistaken, to this: Christians believe that solid virtue results from the succours which Divine grace imparts to the will of men when they implore them with humility; but they are deceived; man alone can do all; and I would conduct Christians to the doctrine of the disciples of Epicurus, who says, “The gods may give me riches, if they please; but I will make myself virtuous.” What self sufficiency is in the language of proud philosophers! Is it then surprising that modern philosophers, who have as much vanity, should have so much pride to boast, as one of them has done, in speaking of the book from whence I have taken this grand error: “Ah! how shall I bring myself to justify this work:” says he in his first letter to Montaigne: “I who think by it to expiate the faults of my whole life; I who, full of confidence, one day hope to say to the supreme Judge, Deign to judge in thy clemency a feeble man; I have done evil upon earth, but I have published this treatise!”

When one sees this proud deception, it calls to mind an anecdote of Gaspard de Javanne, mareschal of France. The night of St. Bartholomew he paraded the streets of Paris to animate the assassins to carnage. “Slaughter! slaughter!” cried he: “It is as good to bleed in August as in May!” His son informs us (says Voltaire) that when his father lay a dying, he made a general confession of his life; and the confessor demanded with an air of astonishment, “How is it that you say nothing of St. Bartholomew?” I look on that (said the mareschal) as a meritorious action, which ought to atone for my other sins. The errors of Emilius are to expiate the sins of M. Rousseau in like manner as the exploits of St. Bartholomew were to expiate the transgressions of M. de Javanne! But let us leave the vanity of this philosopher of Geneva, and consider the piety of a heathen philosopher and legislator, which I have chosen as a contrast. The legislator is Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Locrians. In the exordium to his laws he says, “Every man ought to conduct himself every moment as if that moment were the last of his life; but, if an evil genius entice him to sin, he ought to flee to the foot of the altars, and implore Heaven to banish far from him this evil genius. He must cast himself into the arms of good people, whose counsels will restore him to virtue by representing to him the bounty and the vengeance of God.” How far is this language from the self sufficiency of M. Rousseau! Another Pagan I will oppose to him is Hierocles, who commented on the golden verses of Pythagoras: “Never put thy hand to a work before thou hast implored the gods to finish what thou art about to begin.” Hierocles, it appears, had caught a ray of the morning star which Jesus Christ hath made to shine on the earth. I make use of M. Dacier’s translation. (See Bibliotheque des anciens Philosophes, tom. ii, p. 186, &c.) “Pythagoras describes in these words two things which concur in aiding us to find the true good. These two things are, the voluntary movement of our soul and the succours of Heaven; for although the choice of good be free, and depends upon us, nevertheless, as we derive from God this liberty and ability, we stand in continual need of the Divine support to co - operate with us, and accomplish what we request, for prayer is a medium between our seeking and the gift of God. She addresses that Being who produced us, and who, after having given us a being, giveth us also a well being. And how shall any one receive this well being, if God do not bestow it? And how shall God, who only hath the power of bestowing, give it to those who, being masters of their own movements, will not even deign to request it by prayer? Thus, then, on the one hand, we should not rest solely in our prayers, but follow them by our exertions; and, on the other hand, we should not wholly confide in our actions, but solicit the succours of Heaven; and that we must also join prayer to action, as the form to the matter. Pythagoras leads us to request that which we do, and to do that which we request; for he makes but one of these two: ‘Do not begin,’ says he, ‘to put thy hand to a work before thou hast prayed the gods to finish,’ &c. In short, it is wrong to attempt any thing as if it depended upon us to accomplish it without the succours of God; neither ought we to content ourselves with mere words in prayer, but to exert our utmost efforts to obtain what we request: for otherwise we either embrace only an impious virtue, and without God, if I may be permitted to speak so; or we prefer a mere prayer devoid of action. And that impiety which is in the first part, will entirely ruin the essence of virtue; and the inaction which is in the latter, will absolutely destroy the efficacy of prayer. How can that be good which is not done according to the rule or will of God? And if what we perform is to be done according to this rule, is there no need of the succours of the same God to accomplish and perfect the same? For virtue is the image of God in the reasonable soul; and all images have need of their original in order to exist: but in vain we possess this image, if we have not our eyes continually fixed on the original, whose resemblance only makes the beautiful and good: would we then acquire active virtue we must pray; but in praying we must act, and see that in our actions we always regard the Divinity, and the light with which he is surrounded: that which excites us to wisdom is continual action, in constantly addressing our supplications to the First Cause of all good. The soul which attaches to this cause, and purges herself, as the eye, to render it more clear and quick, is excited to prayer by her application to good works; and by the plenitude of blessings which results from prayer, she redoubles her application, in uniting petitions to good actions, and in assuring and fortifying these good actions by the Divine intercourse. Finding herself in part illuminated from above, she performs what she performs by prayer, and requests by her prayer what she performs. And thus results the union so necessary between prayer and action.”

Behold the true philosophy! See the truth and modesty! How much superior is the language of this Pagan philosopher, to that of these self - sufficient philosophers? O you who think, with M. Rousseau, to merit from heaven by a heap of contradictions, and by a monstrous and unmeaning compilation of the most grand truths, and the most monstrous errors, if you attack revelation, - at least respect true philosophy, and do not cast your veil of antichristian opinions over the truths of the ancient philosophers, which blazed forth amidst the thick shades of heathen darkness.

If the doctrine of Hierocles upon prayer do not appear preferable to that of Rousseau’s philosophy, admit this at least, that Rousseau sometimes wrote as a Christian; for, like the poets who sung of Castor and Pollux, his thoughts were sometimes in the heaven of truth, and some times in the infernal glooms of error. Behold Rousseau, the true philosopher, full of admiration for the Gospel! “The greatest of all wants (says he) is that of feeling our wants. Let us be humble in order to be wise: let us see our feebleness, and we shall be strong. Thus, at one and the same time, let grace and liberty reign: slaves by our own weak ness, we shall be free by prayer; for it depends upon us to implore: and to obtain strength, which we cannot derive from ourselves.” This last doctrine of M. Rousseau is perfectly conformable to the Gospel. Those then who imbibe the poison which this philosopher has scattered in some parts of his works, ought also to taste the antidote which he offers in others.

In taking the liberty of producing certain contradictions of M. Rousseau, the reader is invited to do justice to the beauty of his style, and the sublimity of a great number of his thoughts, by which he hath justly merited a place in the republic of letters.