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Elements of Divinity · section 28 of 142

Questions on Chapter 14.

Elements of Divinity · pp. 194–195

Whoever controls the will must be the proper author of all that necessarily results from it, and consequently should be held accountable for the same. But man, say necessitarians, has no control whatever over his will. It is fixed by necessity just as it is, so that it could no more be otherwise than the effect could cease to result from the cause.

According to this, we may talk as we may about free agency, the liberty of the will, accountability, etc., but man, after all the embellishment we can impart, is a free, accountable agent, just in the same sense as the most insignificant particle of lifeless matter. Here we will close the present chapter by calling to mind what we have endeavored to exhibit.

1. We have endeavored to explain what is implied in the proper free moral agency of man.

2. We have endeavored to establish that doctrine by the evidence of consciousness; by an observation of the history of the world; and by an appeal to the divine administration as set forth in the Scriptures. Let the reader decide.

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER 14.

QUESTION 1. Has the free agency of man been a subject of dispute?

2. In what two general classes are the disputants placed?

3. What is meant by an agent?

4. By a moral agent?

5. By a free moral agent?

6. What is the definition of liberty as given by Edwards?

7. What is the Arminian definition?

8. What is the precise point of controversy between necessitarians and the advocates for free agency, in reference to the will?

9. What are the three leading arguments for free agency?

10. Explain the argument from consciousness.

11. What is the argument from the world’s history?

12. What is the argument from the divine administration as revealed in the Scriptures?

13. How is the proof conducted in reference to Adam in paradise?

14. How, in the addresses to man as a being capable of choosing?

15. How, in reference to the general judgment and rewards and punishments?

16. Has the attempt been made to reconcile necessity and free agency?

17. By what means?

18. How is this attempt shown to be vain?

19. How does it appear that, according to the doctrine of necessity, man cannot be accountable?

20. What kind of free agency is consistent with the doctrine of necessity?

21. What has been attempted in this chapter?