Part Third. — Morals of Christianity.

PART THIRD. — MORALS OF CHRISTIANITY.

OUTLINE.

(I.) The moral law. (Ch. 1.)

(II.) The duties we owe to God. (Ch. 2, 3.)

(III.) Duties to our neighbour. (Ch. 4.)

(I.) THE MORAL LAW. (Ch. 1.)

Preliminary observations: —

(1.) The morals of the New Testament are not presented to us in the form of a regular code.

(2.) The divine authority of the Old Testament is everywhere presupposed. I. The moral laws of the Old Testament pass into the Christian code.

1. The ceremonial law is repealed, being adumbrative and temporary;

2. The political law also; but

3. The moral precepts are not repealed; but even incidentally re-enacted. Scil., Christ’s declaration, “I am not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil;” and Paul’s,” Do we then make void the law through faith?” The argument, then, from the want of formal re-enactment, has no weight.

4. The entire decalogue is brought into the Christian code by a distinct injunction of its separate precepts.

II. These laws, in the Christian code, stand in other and higher circumstances than under the Mosaic dispensation.

1. They are extended more expressly to the heart.

2. They are carried out into a greater variety of duties.

3. There is a more enlarged injunction of positive and particular virtues.

4. All overt acts are connected with corresponding principles.

5. These laws are connected with promises of divine assistance.

6. They have a living illustration in the example of Christ.

7. They are connected with higher sanctions.

III. All attempts to teach morals, independent of Christianity, must be of mischievous tendency.

1. Because such attempts convey the impression that reason alone could discover the duty of man.

2. Because they displace what is perfect for what is imperfect.

3. Because they turn away from the revealed law to inferior considerations such as beauty, fitness, &c.

4. Because they either enjoin duties merely outward in the act, or else assume that human nature is able to cleanse itself.

5. Because that by separating doctrines from morals, they propose a new plan, other than that of the gospel, for renovating and moralizing the world. Yet moral philosophy, if properly guarded, and taken in connexion with the whole Christian system, is not to be undervalued. IV. As to the reasons on which moral precepts rest, it may be remarked,

1. Some rest wholly on the authority of a revealer;

2. Others are accompanied with manifest rational evidence;

3. Others partially disclose their rationale to the anxious inquirer. V. With respect to the application of general precepts, wide observation is necessary.

1. The precepts must be general.

2. Exceptions to general rules should be watched with jealousy. VI. Grounds of moral obligation.

1. “Eternal and necessary fitness of things,” leaves the question still open.

2. “Moral sense,” also unsatisfactory; for

(a.) Its indications are neither perfect nor uniform.

(b.) Its mandates have no authority.

3. “Doctrine of the greatest good:” circuitous, and impossible in practice.

4. The will of God, then, the only true ground of moral obligation. The obligation is founded on the relation of the creature to the Creator. VII. Nature of moral rectitude. (Payne’s view.)

1. We sustain various relations to God.

2. We sustain various relations to each other.

Virtue is the conformity or harmony of man’s affections or actions, with the various regulations in which he has been placed; and since these relations were constituted by God, rectitude may be regarded as conformity to the moral nature of God, the ultimate standard of virtue. (II.) THE DUTIES WE OWE TO GOD. (Ch. 2, 3.)

Summed up in Scripture under the word godliness, embracing I. Internal principles.

1. Submission to God.

(a.) Grounded on the obligations (1) of creation, (2) of redemption. (b.) Regulated by his will, which is the highest rule of moral virtue,

(1) Because of its authority.

(2) Because it defines and enforces every branch of duty.

(3) Because it annuls every contrary rule.

(4) Because, instead of lowering its claims to suit man’s weakness, it connects itself with the offer of strength from on high.

(5) Because it accommodates itself to no man’s interests.

(6) Because it admits no exceptions in obedience.

2. Love to God.

(a.) Its nature.

(b.) Its importance in securing obedience.

3. Trust in God.

(a.) Grounded on the divine injunction. Probable reason, to secure our peace of mind.

(b.) Measured by the divine promises of help in the word of God. (c.) Hence connected with conversion, necessarily.

4. Fear of God.

(a.) Its nature: — (1.) Reverential, not servile; yet (2.) Involving a sense of our conditional liability to his displeasure.

(b.) Its practical influence.

5. Holiness rests upon these moral principles and habits. II. External duties.

A. Prayer.

(a.) It is enjoined in Scripture. Matthew 7:7; Luke 21:36; Philippians 4:6; 1 Thessalonians 5:17. Where it is required to be

(1.) Earnest: John 4:24; Romans 12:12. (2.) Importunate: Luke 11; 2 Corinthians 12:8, 9. (3.) Offered for particular blessings: Philippians 4:6; Psalm 122:6; Zechariah 10:1; 1 Timothy 2:1-3, etc.

(b.) The reason on which it rests. We can infer from Scripture,

1. That it cannot of itself produce in man a fitness for the reception of God’s mercies.

2. That it is not an instrument but a condition of grace.

3. But that it preserves in men’s minds a sense of God’s agency in the world, and of the dependence of all creatures upon him. (c.) Objections to this duty.

1. One is founded on predestination.

a. Answer on predestinarian principles insufficient and contradictory. b. True answer, that although God has absolutely predetermined some things, there are others which he has conditionally predetermined.

2. A second is founded on the perfections of the divine character. Paley’s answer.

3. A third is, that it is hard to conceive how prayer can affect the case of others.

a. If it were so, that would not affect the duty.

b. But it is no harder to conceive than why one man’s virtues or vices should affect the condition of others, which is the case every day. (d.) Division of prayer. Four branches.

1. Ejaculatory.

a. Its nature.

b. Its advantages.

2. Private.

a. Founded upon Christ’s injunction and example.

b. Designed to produce unlimited confidence in God our Father.

3. Family.

a. Paley’s view of it defective.

b. Its obligation shown, (1.) From the very constitution of a family. (2.) From the fact that the earliest patriarchal worship was family worship, which was not revoked either by Judaism or Christianity. c. Its advantages.

4. Public.

a. Its obligation shown. (1.) From the example of public worship among the Jews. (2.) By inference, from the command to publish the gospel implying assemblies. (3) By direct precepts, e. g., Paul’s Epistles are commanded to be read in churches. (4.) From the practice of the primitive age, shown from St. Paul and St. Clement.

b. Its advantages.

(e.) Forms of prayer.

1. Worship should be spiritual — which was doubtless the character of that of the primitive Church. Latin and Greek corruptions. The liturgies of the reformed churches purified from these corruptions.

2. Objections to forms of prayer.

a. Absolute. But

(1.) This objection involves principles which cannot be acted upon.

(2.) It disregards example and antiquity. Example of Jews: of John Baptist: of Christ: of primitive Church.

b. It is objected, that “forms composed for one age become unfit for another.” But,

(1.) The form may be modified.

(2.) In fact, such forms have not become obsolete among us.

(3.) If opinions become unscriptural, the form is a safeguard against heresy. c. “The repetition of the form produces weariness and inattention. Answer,

(1.) The devout will not grow weary.

(2.) The undevout will, even if extempore prayers are used. d. “Forms must take too general a character.” Answer,

(1.) This is not true of the Liturgy of the Church of England.

(2.) If extempore prayer be allowed also, the objection has no weight.

3. Objections to extempore prayer.

a. It gives rise to extravagant addresses to God. Ans. This will only be the case where the preachers are foolish or incompetent.

b. It confuses the minds of the hearers. Ans. This lay against the inspired prayers in the Bible when first uttered; and would now lie against all occasional forms. Facts, too, disprove it.

4. Conclusion. That each mode has its advantages, and that their proper combination forms the best public service.

B. Praise and thanksgiving.

a. Psalms and hymns, to be sung with the voice, and united with the melody of the heart, are of apostolic injunction.

b. Uses. 1) To acknowledge God. 2) To promote suitable sentiments of gratitude and dependence in our hearts.

C. Observance of the Lord’s day. (Ch. 3.)

I. Obligation.

(I.) Though the observance is nowhere enjoined in so many words, yet, on the supposition that the Sabbath was instituted at the creation, we derive its obligation with great clearness from the Scriptures. a. As to the observance of a Sabbath in general.

(1.) Inferentially, from the history of its observance from the creation down to the period of the gospel narrative, while no Scripture indicates its abolition.

(2.) Directly, since the decalogue is binding on us, proved, (a.) By our Lord’s declaration, that he “came not to destroy the law and the prophets.”

(b.) By the text, “the Sabbath was made for man.”

(c.) By St. Paul’s reply, (Romans 3:31,) “Do we then make void the law through faith?”

b. As to the observance of a particular day: —

(1.) The change from the seventh to the first day was made by inspired men.

(2.) This change did not alter the law of the Sabbath, which was not so circumstantial as to require uniform modes of reckoning time, and observance of latitudes and longitudes for its fulfilment.

(3.) The original command says nothing of the epoch when the reckoning should begin. (Holden)

(4.) But, for the sake of public worship, the Sabbath should be uniformly observed by a whole community at the same time.

(II.) But it has been denied that the Sabbath was instituted at the creation. a. Paley’s ground, as summed up and answered by Holden. His principal ground is, “that the first restitution of the Sabbath took place during the sojourning of the Jews in the wilderness;” and from the passage in Exodus 16, he infers,

1. “That if the Sabbath had been instituted at creation, there would be some mention of it in the history of the patriarchal ages.” But this history is very brief: there are omissions in it more extraordinary, e. g., prayer and circumcision. The Sabbath is hardly mentioned in Joshua, Judges, Ruth, &c.: but the observance of it seems to be intimated by the division of time into weeks, in the patriarchal history.

2. “That there is not, in Exodus 16, any intimation that the Sabbath was only the revival of an ancient institution.” But the fact is, that it is mentioned exactly in the way an historian would, who had occasion to speak of a well-known institution.

3. Genesis, chap. 2, is next adduced by Dr. Paley as not inconsistent with his opinion, as he concurs with those critics who suppose that Moses mentioned the sanctification of the Sabbath in that place, by prolepsis, in the order of connexion, not of time. But this doctrine is altogether gratuitous, and also inconsistent with the design of the sacred historian to give a clear and faithful history.

The law of the Sabbath, then, is universal, and not peculiar to the Jews. II. Mode of observing the Christian Sabbath.

1. There are two extremes: (1.) To regard the Sabbath merely as a prudential institution; (2.) To neglect the distinction between the moral and the ceremonial law of Moses: but yet,

2. Those precepts of the Levitical code which relate to the Sabbath are of great use to us, though, independent of these,

3. We have throughout the Scriptures abundant guidance, — by which we learn, a.) That the Sabbath is to be a day of rest and devotion. b.) That works of mercy are not unlawful, c.) But that the management of public charities is too secular an employment for the Sabbath. d.) And that amusements and recreations are out of place, nay, sinful. (III.) DUTIES TO OUR NEIGHBOUR. (Ch. 4.)

I. CHARITY, which is to be considered,

1. As to its source.

That source is a regenerated state of mind.

2. As to its exclusiveness. It shuts out all 1) anger; 2) implacability; 3) revenge; 4) prejudice; 5) evil-speaking; 6) petty aggressions, though legal; 7) artificial distinctions, as its limitations.

3. As to its active expression.

(1.) It delights in sympathy, liberality, &c., as it is not merely negative. (2.) It dictates and regulates works of mercy. (3) It teaches us that we are only stewards of the divine goodness.

II. JUSTICE. (I.) Ethical. (II.) Economical. (III.) Political. (I.) Ethical justice respects,

A. Man’s natural rights, which are,

1. Right to life; which is guarded by the precept, “Thou shalt not kill,” &c.

2. Right of property: guarded by the law, “Thou shalt not steal nor covet.”

3. Right of liberty. Manstealing is classed in the New Testament with the greatest crimes. In noticing the question of slavery, we remark, a.) That slavery did exist under the Jewish law; but of a much milder type than that which prevailed in the surrounding nations; and all that can be inferred from it is, that a legislature may, in certain cases, be justified in mitigating, rather than abolishing, the evil.

b.) Every Christian government binds itself to be regulated by the principles of the New Testament, which are obviously opposed to slavery. c.) Modern African slavery of course calls loudly for the application of such principles. The slaves have never lost the right to liberty; and that liberty should be restored. The manner of its restoration is in the power of government, provided, 1. That the emancipation be sincerely determined upon at some future time. 2. That it be not delayed beyond the period which the general interest of the slaves themselves prescribes. 3. That all possible means be adopted to render freedom a good to them. B. The question may be asked, whether man himself has the power of surrendering these great natural rights at his own option?

1. With respect to life.

(1.) Where duty calls, (as in case of invasion, or when our allegiance to Christ must otherwise be laid down,) we are not only at liberty to take the risk, but bound to do it.

(2.) Suicide was considered unlawful by the ancients, on the ground of its being a violation of God’s appointment; and modern ethical writers have added little to the force of their doctrines on the subject. Of course their views are inefficient. “Thou shalt not kill,” is the divine prohibition against killing ourselves as well as others: — not, “Thou shalt do no murder,” as Archbishop Whately incorrectly quotes, and then reasons upon. The crime of murder lies in the fact that man is made in the image of God — immortal. Self-murder is unpardonable.

(3.) Duelling involves the two crimes of murder and suicide.

2. With respect to property. Christianity teaches us that property is a trust; and that gambling, prodigality, &c., are violations of that trust.

3. Liberty cannot be voluntarily parted with under the Christian dispensation.

C. The right of conscience is now to be considered.

1. The duty of religious worship and opinions, and the right to the profession of the latter and practice of the former, are strictly correlative; and as the obligation to perform the duty cannot be removed, so neither can the right to its performance be destroyed.

2. But government has authority to take cognizance of the manner in which this right is exercised, and can interfere (1,) where the worship is vexatious to society in general; or (2,) the opinions subversive of the principles of social order; or (3,) where dangerous political opinions are connected with religious notions.

3. The case of those who reject revelation must be considered on its own merits.

(1.) Simple Deism may afford such a plea of conscience as the state ought to admit, though rejected by a sound theologian.

(2.) To Atheism no toleration can be extended by a Christian government; — for, a) jurisprudence cannot coexist with such doctrines; b) they are subversive of the morals of the people; and, c) no conscience can be pleaded by their votaries for the avowal of such tenets. (II.) Economical justice respects those relations which grow out of the existence of men in families.

1. Relation of husband and wife, founded on the institution of marriage.

(1.) Obligation of marriage. General, but not imperative, on every man, in all circumstances. Exceptions require the justification of an equal or paramount obligation.

(2.) Ends of marriage.

(a.) To produce the greatest number of healthy children. (b.) To fix the relations which give rise to the domestic affections, etc. (c.) To prevent polygamy, which, 1, was forbidden by the original law, although the practice of the Jews may have fallen short of it; 2, was expressly forbidden by Christ in his discourse with the Pharisees; 3, is forbidden also by nature.

(d.) To prevent fornication, which it does, 1, by providing for a lawful gratification of the sexual appetite; 2, by the mutual love which it presupposes in the parties, without which the institution is profaned.

(3.) Character of the marriage contract.

(a.) It is partly a civil contract — being under the control of the State for weighty reasons.

(b.) It is also a religious act, in which vows are made to God by the contracting parties. Though the Scriptures do not expressly assign its celebration to the ministers of religion, yet the State has wisely done it.

(4.) Rights and duties of marriage.

2. Duties of children. Comprehensiveness of the precept, “Honour thy father and thy mother,” embracing

(1.) Love, comprising esteem and gratitude.

(2.) Reverence, comprising, a,) the desire to please; b,) the fear to offend; c,) the external manifestation of these in honour and civility; and, d,) the support of parents when in necessity.

(3.) Obedience, which is to be universal, except in cases of conscience. This rule is most severely and frequently tried in regard to marriage. Here, a.) The child is not bound to marry at the command of the parents. b.) But should not violate their prohibition, except only when the parties are of age, and then only if, 1,) the opposition is to a child’s marrying a religious person; or, 2,) is capricious; or, 3,) is unreasonable.

3. Duties of parents.

(1.) Love, implying,

(a.) The natural instinct of affection, cultivated by religion. (b.) The care and support of offspring.

(2.) Instruction, which includes,

(a.) The education of children in a way suited to their condition. (b.) Their training in the “nurture and admonition of the Lord” — as the parent is a priest in his own family: and,

(c.) The affording them a godly example.

(3.) Government, which should be,

(a.) Mild and gentle.

(b.) Firm and faithful, implying even the use of corporeal punishment when necessary.

(4.) Provision for the settlement of children in the world is a duty of parents, only limited by their ability.

4. Duties of servant and master.

(a.) This is a relation which must exist, as equality of condition is impossible.

(b.) But it is a source of great evil, when unregulated by religion. (c) The precepts of the New Testament go to prevent this evil, by assigning,

(1.) The duties of servants, viz., honour and obedience — which are to be cheerful and from the heart.

(2.) The reciprocal duties of servants and masters; involving obedience on the one part, and kindness, moderation, and justice, on the other; and,

(3.) The religious duties of masters, including — 1. Religious instruction.

2. The observance of the Sabbath. 3. Existing influence in favour of religion.

(III.) Political justice.

1. Origin of power.

(a.) The Scriptures declare government to be an ordinance of God. (b.) The doctrine of a “social compact” is therefore unscriptural. (c.) Paley’s view, which places the obligation in the will of God, as collected from expediency, is too loose: that will is declared in Scripture.

2. Rights and duties of sovereign and subject reciprocal. (a.) Duties of government, — enactment of just laws, etc. Obligation grounded on direct passages of Scripture.

(b.) Duties of subjects, — obedience, tribute, prayer, &c.

3. Question, “How far does it consist with Christian submission to endeavour to remedy the evils of a government?”

(a.) No form of government is enjoined in Scripture. Hence there is no divine right in particular families.

(b.) Resistance to an established government, whatever may be its form, is consistent with duty only in certain extreme cases. There are two kinds of resistance: —

1. Of opinion. In order to be lawful, this resistance must be, (1) just; (2) directed against public acts; (3) practical; (4) deliberate; (5) not factious;

(6) not respecting local but general interests.

2. Of force. This may be divided into two kinds: —

(1.) That of a controlling force in the government: e. g., the British Parliament, which can refuse supplies, etc. This resistance, which is implied by a constitution, is lawful, when advisedly and patriotically employed.

(2.) That of arms. Three cases may be supposed: — a.) Where the nation enjoys and values good institutions. Here unjust aggressions will not succeed.

b.) Where popular opinion is only partly enlightened. Here the work of improvement should precede resistance. Should the despot triumph, patriotism will suffer. Should the reformers triumph, the ignorant mass run on into licentiousness: e. g., French Revolution and Parliamentary War. c.) Where the sovereign power acts, by mercenaries or otherwise, in opposition to the views of the majority. Here resistance is justifiable: e. g., Revolution of 1688.

(c.) The case of rival governments.

(d.) Resistance for conscience’ sake.