Iii.
“Another instance is taken from one of your hymns, where are these lines: — (Page 119.)
‘Doom, if thou canst, to endless pains,
And drive me from thy face:’”
(Add,
“But if thy stronger love constrains,
Let me be saved by grace.”)
“This I thought the height of insensibility, extravagance, and presumption. You see nothing of these in it. And yet you explain yourself thus: ‘If thou canst deny thyself, if thou canst forget to be gracious, if thou canst cease to be truth and love:’ All which, in my opinion, is fixing the charge most strongly upon you. For the supposition that Christ can do these things” — Are you in earnest, Sir? Are you really ignorant, that expressions of this kind do not suppose he can, but quite the reverse? that they are one of the strongest forms of obtestation, of adjuring God to show mercy, by all his grace, and truth, and love? So far is this also from proving the charge of “stoical insensibility.”
III.
1. I come now to consider the point of Church communion, of which you have spoke in the beginning of your Treatise. In the entrance, you say, “We teach no other doctrine than has always been taught in our Church. Our sentiments concerning justification are reconcilable to our Articles, Homilies, and Service. This I apprehend several of the Methodists have been convinced of, and have therefore left our communion entirely. You give us more instances than one of this in your last Journal.” (Page 2.) No, not one. Nor did I ever yet know one man who “therefore left the communion of the Church,” because he was convinced that either her Articles, Homilies, or Liturgy, opposed his sentiments concerning justification. Poor Mr. St — and Mr. Simpson were induced to leave it by reasons of quite another kind.
You add, “We cannot wonder that some Methodists have withdrawn from her, while they have been used to hear doctrines which they must have been sensible have no place in her Articles and Service.” So far from it, that all I know of them are deeply sensible, the “doctrines they have been used to hear” daily, are no other than the genuine doctrines of the Church, as expressed both in her Articles and Service.
2. But our present question turns not on doctrine but discipline. “My first business,” you say, “is to consider some very lax notions of Church communion which I find in your last Journal. Vol. I. p. 262, you say, ‘Our Twentieth Article defines a true Church, a congregation of faithful people, wherein the true word of God is preached, and the sacraments duly administered.’” (Page 3.) The use I would willingly make of this definition, (which, observe, is not mine, be it good or bad,) is to stop the boasting of ungodly men, by cutting off their pretense to call themselves of the Church. But you think they may call themselves so still. Then let them. I will not contend about it.
But you cannot infer from hence, that my notions of Church communion are either lax or otherwise. The definition which I occasionally cite shows nothing of my sentiments on that head. And for anything which occurs in this page, they may be strict or loose, right or wrong.
You add, “It will be requisite, in order to approve yourself a Minister of our Church, that you follow her rules and orders; that you constantly conform to the method of worship she has prescribed, and study to promote her peace.” (Page 5.) All this is good and fit to be done. But it properly belongs to the following question: —
“What led you into such very loose notions of Church communion, I imagine, might be, your being conscious to yourself, that, according to the strict, just account of the Church of England, you could not, with any grace, maintain your pretensions to belong still to her.” Sir, I have never told you yet what my notions of Church communion are. They may be wrong, or they may be right, for all you know. Therefore, when you are first supposing that I have told you my notions, and then assigning the reasons of them, what can be said, but that you imagine the whole matter?
3. How far I have acted agreeably to the rules and orders of our Church, is a farther question. You think I have acted contrary thereto, First, by using extemporary prayer in public. “The Church,” you say, “has strongly declared her mind on this point, by appointing her excellent Liturgy, which you have solemnly promised to use, and no other.” I know not when or where. “And whoever does not worship God in the manner she prescribes must be supposed to slight and contemn her offices and rules; and therefore can be no more worthy to be called her Minister.” (Ibid. p. 7.) I do not “slight or contemn the offices” of the Church; I esteem them very highly. And yet I do not, at all times, worship God, even in public, in the very terms of those offices. Nor yet do I knowingly “slight or contemn her rules:” For it is not clear to my apprehension, that she has any rule which forbids using extemporary prayer, suppose between the Morning and Evening Service. And if I am “not worthy to be called her Minister,” (which I dare by no means affirm myself to be,) yet her Minister I am, and must always be, unless I should be judicially deposed from my ministry. Your Second argument is this: “If you suppose the Scripture enjoins you to use extemporary prayer, then you must suppose our Liturgy to be inconsistent with Scripture; and, consequently, unlawful to be used.” That does not follow; unless I supposed the Scripture to enjoin, to use extemporary prayer and no other. Then it would follow, that a form of prayer was inconsistent with Scripture. But this I never did suppose. Your Third argument is to this effect: “You act contrary to the rule of the Church. Allow she is in the wrong; yet, while you break her rule, how do you act as her Minister?” It ought to be expressed, “How are you her Minister?” for the conclusion to be proved is, that I am not her Minister. I answer,
(1.) I am not convinced, as I observed before, that I do hereby break her rule.
(2.) If I did, yet should I not cease to be her Minister, unless I were formally deprived.
(3.) I now actually do continue in her communion, and hope that I always shall.
4. You object farther, that I “disobey the governors of the Church.” I answer, I both do, and will, obey them in all things, where I do not apprehend there is some particular law of God to the contrary. “Here,” you say, “you confess that in some things you do not, and cannot obey your governors.” (Page 8.) Did I confess this? Then I spoke rashly aud foolishly; for I granted more than I can make good. I do certainly apprehend that the law of God requires me, both to preach, and, sometimes, to pray extempore. Yet I do not know that I disobey the governors of the Church herein: For I do not know that they have forbidden me to do either.
But your “behavior and method of teaching is irregular. Have you any warrant from Scripture for preaching” up and down thus? I think I have; I think God hath called me to this work “by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery,” which directs me how to obey that general command, “While we have time, let us do good unto all men.”
“But we ought to do this agreeably to our respective situations, and not break in upon each other’s provinces. Every private man may take upon himself the office of a Magistrate and quote this text as justly as you have done.” (Page 9.) No; the private man is not called to the office of a Magistrates; but I am to the office of a Preacher. “You was, indeed, authorized to preach the gospel; but it was in the congregation to which you should be lawfully appointed. Whereas you have many years preached in places whereunto you was not lawfully appointed; nay, which were entrusted to others, who neither wanted nor desired your assistance.” Many of them wanted it enough, whether they desired it or no. But I shall not now debate that point. I rather follow you to the First Part of the “Farther Appeal,” where this objection is considered.
5. “Our Church,” it was said, “has provided against this preaching up and down, in the ordination of a Priest, by expressly limiting the exercise of the powers then conferred upon him to the congregation where he shall be lawfully appointed thereunto.”
I answered,
(1.) “Your argument proves too much. If it be allowed just as you propose it, it proves that no Priest, has authority either to preach or administer the sacrament in any other than his own congregation.” (Farther Appeal.)
You reply, “Is there no difference between a thing’s being done occasionally, and its being done for years together?” Yes, a great one; and more inconveniences may arise from the latter than from the former. But this is all wide: It does not touch the point. Still, if our Church does expressly limit the exercise of the sacerdotal powers to that congregation whereunto each Priest shall be appointed, this precludes him from exercising those powers at all, in any other than that congregation. I answered,
(2.) “Had the powers conferred been so limited when I was ordained Priest, my ordination would have signified just nothing. For I was not appointed to any congregation at all; but was ordained as a member of that ‘College of Divines,’ (so our Statutes express it,) ‘founded to overturn all heresies, and defend the catholic faith.’”
You reply, “I presume it was expected you should either continue at your College, or enter upon some regular cure.” Perhaps so; but I must still insist, that if my sacerdotal powers had been then expressly limited to that congregation whereunto I should be appointed, my ordination would have signified nothing. I mean, I could never, in virtue of that ordination have exercised those powers at all; seeing I never was appointed to any single congregation, at least not till I went to Georgia.
I answered,
(3.) “For many years after I was ordained Priest, this limitation was never heard of. I heard not one syllable of it, by way of objection to my preaching up and down in Oxford or London, or the parts adjacent; in Gloucestershire or Worcestershire; in Lancashire, Yorkshire, or Lincolnshire. Nor did the strictest disciplinarian scruple suffering me to exercise those powers wherever I came.”
You reply, “There is great difference between preaching occasionally, with the leave of the incumbents, and doing it constantly without their leave.” I grant there is; and there are objections to the latter, which do not reach the former case. But they do not belong to this head. They do not in the least affect this consequence, — “If every Priest, when ordained, is expressly limited, touching the exercise of the power then received, to that congregation to which he shall be appointed; then is he precluded by this express limitation from preaching, with or without the incumbent’s leave, in any other congregation whatever.”
I answered,
(4.) “Is it not, in fact, universally allowed, that every Priest, as such, has a power, in virtue of his ordination, to preach in any congregation, where the Curate desires his assistance?”
You reply to this by what you judge a parallel case. But it does not touch the restriction in question. Either this does, or does not, expressly limit the exercise of the powers conferred upon a Priest in his ordination to that congregation whereunto he shall be appointed. If it does not, I am not condemned by this, however faulty I may be on a thousand other accounts. If it does, then is every Priest condemned whoever preaches out of the congregation to which he is appointed.
Your parallel case is this: “Because a man does not offend against the law of the land, when I prevail upon him to teach my children;” therefore “he is empowered to seize” (read, he does not offend against the law of the land in seizing) “an apartment in my house, and against my will and approbation to continue therein, and to direct and dictate to my family!” (Page 11.)
An exact parallel indeed! When, therefore, I came to live in St. Luke’s parish, was it just the same thing as if I had seized an apartment in Dr. Buckley’s house? And was the continuing therein against his will and approbation (supposing it were so) precisely the same, as if I had continued in his house, whether he would or no? Is the one exactly the same offense against the law of the land as the other? Once more. Is the warning sinners in Moorfields to flee from the wrath to come, the very same with directing the Doctor’s family under his own roof? I should not have answered this, but that I was afraid you would conclude it was unanswerable.
I answered the former objector,
(5.) “Before those words which you suppose to imply such a restraint, were those spoken without any restraint or limitation at all, which I apprehend to convey an indelible character, ‘Receive the Holy Ghost, for the office and work of a Priest in the church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands.’”
You reply, “The question is not, whether you are in orders or not.” (Ibid. p. 12.) I am glad to hear it. I really thought it was. “But whether you have acted suitably to the directions or rules of the Church of England.” Not suitably to that rule, if it were strictly to be interpreted, of preaching only in a single congregation. But I have given my reasons why I think it cannot be so interpreted. And those reasons I do not see that you have invalidated.
I would only add, If I am in orders, if I am a Minister still, and yet not a Minister of the Church of England, of what Church am I a Minister? Whoever is a Minister at all is a Minister of some particular Church. Neither can he cease to be a Minister of that Church, till he is cast out of it by a judicial sentence. Till, therefore, I am so cast out, (which I trust will never be,) I must style myself a Minister of the Church of England.
6. Your next objection is, “You not only erect Bands, which, after the Moravians, you call the United Society, but also give out tickets to those that continue therein.” These Bands, you think, “have had very bad consequences, as was to be expected, when weak people are made leaders of their brethren, and are set upon expounding Scripture.” (Ibid.) You are in some mistakes here. For,
(1.) The Bands are not called the United Society.
(2.) The United Society was originally so called, not after the Moravians, but because it consisted of several smaller societies united together.
(3.) Neither the Bands nor the leaders of them, as such, are “set upon expounding Scripture.”
(4.) The good consequences of their meeting together in Bands, I know; but the very bad consequences, I know not.
When any members of these, or of the United Society, are proved to live in known sin, we then mark and avoid them; we separate ourselves from every one that walks disorderly. Sometimes, if the case be judged infectious, (though rarely,) this is openly declared. And this you style “excommunication;” and say, “Does not every one see a separate ecclesiastical society or communion?” (Page 13.) No. This society does not separate from the communion of the rest of the Church of England. They continue steadfastly with them, both “in the apostolical doctrine, and in the breaking of bread, and in prayers.” (Which neither Mr. St — nor Mr. Simpson does, nor the gentleman who writes to you in favor of the Moravians, who also writes pressingly to me to separate myself from the Church.) A society “over which you had appointed yourself a governor.” No so far as I governed them, it was at their own entreaty. “And took upon you all the spiritual authority which the very highest Church Governor could claim.” What! at Kingswood, in February, 1740-1? Not so. I took upon me no other authority (then and there at least) than any Steward of a society exerts by the consent of the other members. I did neither more nor less than declare, that they who had broken our rules were no longer of our society.
“Can you pretend that you received this authority from our Church?” Not by ordination; for I did not exert it as a Priest; but as one whom that society had voluntarily chosen to be at the head of them. “Or that you exercised it in subjection or subordination to her lawful Governors?” I think so; I am sure I did not exercise it in any designed opposition to them. “Did you ever think proper to consult or advise with them, about fixing the terms of your communion?” If you mean, about fixing the rules of admitting or excluding from our society, I never did think it either needful or proper. Nor do I at this day.
“How then will you vindicate all these powers?” All these are, “declaring those are no longer of our society.” “Here is a manifest congregation. Either it belonged to the Church of England, or not. If it did not, you set up a separate communion against her. And how then are you injured, in being thought to have withdrawn from her?” I have nothing to do with this. The antecedent is false: Therefore the consequent falls of course. “If it did belong to the Church, show where the Church gave you such authority of controlling and regulating it?” Authority of putting disorderly members out of that society? The society itself gave me that authority. “What private Clergyman can plead her commission to be thus a Judge and Ordinary, even in his own parish?” Any Clergyman or layman, without pleading her commission, may be thus a Judge and Ordinary. “Are not these powers inherent in her Governors, and committed to the higher order of her Clergy?” No; not the power of excluding members from a private society, — unless on supposition of some such rule as ours is, viz., “That if any man separate from the Church, he is no longer a member of our society.”
7. But you have more proof yet: “The Grand Jury in Georgia found, that you had called yourself Ordinary of Savannah. Nor was this fact contradicted even by those of the Jury who, you say, wrote in your favor: So that it appears, you have long, had an inclination to be independent and uncontrolled.” This argument ought to be good; for it is far fetched. The plain case was this: That Grand Jury did assert, that, in Mr. Causton’s hearing, I had called myself Ordinary of Savannah. The minority of the Jury, in their letter to the Trustees, refuted the other allegations particularly; but thought this so idle an one, that they did not deign to give it any farther reply, than,
“As to the eighth bill we are in doubt, as not well knowing the meaning of the word Ordinary.” See Vol. I.
You add, “I appeal to any reasonable man, whether you have not acted: is an Ordinary, nay, a Bishop, in Kingswood.” If you mean, in “declaring those disorderly members were no longer of that society;” I admit your appeal, whether I therein acted as a Bishop, or as any Steward of a society may. “Nay, you have gone far beyond the generality of the Dissenters themselves; who do not commit the power of excommunication, and appointing to preach,” (that is another question,) “to the hands of any private Minister.” The power of excommunication. True; but this was not excommunication, but a quite different thing.
How far, in what circumstances, and in what sense, I have “appointed men to preach,” I have explained at large in the Third Part of the “Farther Appeal.” But I wait for farther light; and am ready to consider, as I am able, whatever shall be replied to what is there advanced.
8. Your general conclusion is, “Whatever your pretenses or professions may be, you can be looked upon by serious and impartial persons, not as a member, much less a Minister, of the Church of England, but as no other than an enemy to her constitution, worship, and doctrine, raising divisions and disturbances in her communion.” (Ibid. p. 76.) “And yet you say, ‘I cannot have greater regard to her rules.’ ‘I dare not renounce communion with her.’” (Ibid. p. 15.)
I do say so still. I cannot have a greater regard to any human rules, than to follow them in all things, unless where I apprehend there is a divine rule to the contrary. I dare not renounce communion with the Church of England. As a Minister, I teach her doctrines; I use her offices; I conform to her Rubrics; I suffer reproach for my attachment to her. As a private member, I hold her doctrines; I join in her offices, in prayer, in hearing, in communicating. I expect every reasonable man, touching these facts, to believe his own eyes and ears. But if these facts are so, how dare any man of common sense charge me with renouncing the Church of England?
9. Use ever so many exaggerations, still the whole of this matter is,
(1.) I often use extemporary prayer.
(2.) Wherever I can, I preach the gospel.
(3.) Those who desire to live the gospel, I advise how to watch over each other, and to put from them such as walk disorderly. Now, whether these things are, on other considerations, right or wrong, this single point I must; still insist on: “All this does not prove, either that I am no member, or that I am no Minister, of the Church of England: Nay, nothing can prove, I am no member of the Church, till I either am excommunicated, or renounce her communion, and no longer join in her doctrine, and in the breaking of bread, and in prayer.
Nor can anything prove, I am no Minister of the Church, till I either am deposed from my ministry, or voluntarily renounce her, and wholly cease to teach her doctrines, use her offices, and obey her Rubrics for conscience’ sake.
However, I grant, that whatsoever is “urged on this head deserves my most serious consideration.” And whensoever I am convinced, that by taking any methods, more or less different from those I now take, I may better “consult the honor of religion, and be able to do more good in the