To His Father

LETTERS from

THE REVEREND JOHN WESLEY,

TO

VARIOUS PERSONS.



I. — To his Father.

DEAR SIR, LINCOLN COLLEGE, December 19 1729.

AS I was looking over, the other day, Mr. Ditton’s Discourse on the Resurrection of Christ, I found, toward the end of it, a sort of essay on the Origin of Evil. I fancied the shortness of it, if nothing else, would make you willing to read it; though very probably you will not find much in it which has not occurred to your thoughts before.

“Since the supreme Being must needs be infinitely and essentially good, as well as wise and powerful, it has been esteemed no little difficulty to show how evil came into the world. Unde malum, 1 has been a mighty question.” (Page 424.)

There were some who, in order to solve this, supposed two supreme, governing principles; the one a good, the other an evil one: Which latter has independent on, and of equal power with, the former, and the author of all that was irregular or bad in the universe. This monstrous scheme the Manichees fell into, and much improved; but were sufficiently confuted by St. Austin, who had reason to be particularly acquainted with their tenets. But the plain truth is, the hypothesis requires no more to the confutation of it, than the bare proposing it. Two supreme, independent principles, is next door to a contradiction in terms. It is the very same thing, in result and consequence, as saying two absolute infinites; and he that says two, had as good say ten or fifty, or any other number whatever. Nay, if there can be two essentially distinct, absolute infinites, there may be an infinity of such absolute infinites; that is as much as to say, none of them all would be an absolute infinite, or, that none of them all would be properly and really infinite. “For real infinity is strict and absolute infinity, and only that.”

“From the nature of liberty and free will, we may deduce a very possible and satisfactory (perhaps the only possible just) account of the origin of evil.

“There are, and necessarily must be, some original, intrinsic agreements and disagreements, fitnesses and unfitnesses of certain things and circumstances, to and with each other; which are antecedent to all positive institutions, founded on the very nature of those things and circumstances, considered in themselves, and in their relation to each other. “As these all fall within the comprehension of an infinite, discerning mind, who is likewise infinite, essential rectitude and reason; so those on the one side must necessarily (to speak after the manner of men) The chosen or approved of by him, as the other disliked and disapproved; and this on the score of the eternal, intrinsic agreeableness and disagreeableness of them. “Farther: It no way derogated from any one perfection of an infinite Being to endow other beings which he made with such a power as we call liberty; that is, to furnish them with such capacities, dispositions, and principles of action, that it should be possible for them either to observe or to deviate from those eternal rules and measures of fitness and agreeableness, with respect to certain things and circumstances, which were conformable to the infinite rectitude of his own will, and which infinite reason must

necessarily discover. Now, evil a deviation from those measures of eternal, unerring order and reason; not to choose what is worthy to be chosen, and is accordingly chose by such a will as the divine. And to bring this about, no more is necessary, than the exerting certain acts of that power we call free will. By which power we are enabled to choose or refuse, and to determine ourselves to action accordingly. Therefore, without having recourse to any ill principle, we may fairly account for the origin of evil, from the possibility of a various use of our liberty; even as that capacity or possibility itself is ultimately founded on the delectability and finiteness of a created nature.”

I am, dear Sir,

Your dutiful and affectionate son.

II. — To the Same.

DEAR SIR, January, 1731.

THOUGH some of the postulata upon which Archbishop King builds his hypothesis of the Origin of Evil be such as very few will admit of, yet since the superstructure is regular and well contrived, I thought you would not be unwilling to see the scheme of that celebrated work. He divides it into five chapters.

The sum of the first chapter is this: — The first notions we have of outward things are our conceptions of motion, matter, and space. Concerning each of these, we soon observe that it does not exist of itself; and, consequently that there must be some first cause, to which all of them owe their existence. Although we have no faculty for the direct perception of this First Cause, and so can know very little more of Him than a blind man of light, yet thus much we know of him, by the faculties we have, that He is one, infinite in nature and power, free, intelligent, and omniscient; that, consequently, he proposes to himself an end in every one of his actions; and that the end of his creating the world was, the exercise of his power, and wisdom, and goodness; which he therefore made as perfect as it could be made by infinite goodness, and power, wisdom. Chapter II. But, if so, how came evil into the world? If the would was made by such an agent, with such an intention, how is it that either imperfection or natural or moral evils have a place in it? Is not this difficulty best solved by the Manichaean supposition, that there is an evil as well as a good principle? By no means; for it is just as repugnant to infinite goodness to create what it foresaw would be spoiled by another, as to create what would be spoiled by the constitution of its own nature: Their supposition therefore leaves the difficulty as it found it. But if it could be proved, that to permit evils in the world is consistent with, nay, necessarily results from, infinite goodness, then the difficulty would vanish; and to prove this, is the design of the following treatise. Chapter III. All created beings, as such, are necessarily imperfect; nay, infinitely distant from supreme perfection; Nor can they all be equally perfect; since some must be only parts of others. As to their properties too, some must be perfecter than others; for suppose any number of the most perfect beings created, infinite goodness would prompt the Creator to add less perfect beings to those, if their existence neither lessened the number nor conveniences of the more perfect. The existence of matter, for instance, neither lessens the number nor the conveniences of pure spirits. Therefore, the addition of material beings to spiritual, was not contrary to, but resulted from, infinite goodness.

Chapter IV. As the evils of imperfection necessarily spring from this, that the imperfect things were made out of nothing, so natural evils necessarily spring from their being made out of matter. For matter is totally useless without motion, or even without such a motion as will divide it into parts; but this cannot be done without a contrariety of motions; and from this necessarily flows generation and corruption.

The material part of us being thus liable to corruption pain is necessary to make us watchful against it, and to warn, us of what tends toward it; as is the fear of death likewise which is of use in many cases that pain does not reach. From these all the passions necessarily spring; nor can these be extinguished while those remain. But if pain and the fear of death were extinguished, no animal could long subsist. Since, therefore, these evils are necessarily joined with more than equivalent goods, the permitting these is not repugnant to, but flows from, infinite goodness. The same observation holds as to hunger, thirst, childhood, age, diseases, wild beasts, and poisons. They are all, therefore, permitted because each of them is necessarily connected with such a good as outweighs the evil. Chapter V. Touching moral evils, (by which I mean “inconveniences arising from the choice of the sufferer,”) I propose to show,

1. What is the nature of choice or election.

2. That our happiness consists in the elections or choices we make.

3. What elections are improper to be made.

4. How we come to make such elections. And,

5. How our making them is consistent with the divine power and goodness.

1. By liberty, I mean, an active, self determining power, which does not choose things because they are pleasing, but is pleased with them because it chooses them.

That God is endued with such a power, I conclude,

(1.) Because nothing is good or evil, pleasing or displeasing, to him, before he chooses it.

(2.) Because his will or choice is the cause of goodness in all created things.

(3.) Because if God had not been endued with such a principle, he would never have created anything.

But it is to be observed, farther, that God sees and chooses whatever is connected with what he chooses in the same instant; and that he likewise chooses whatever is convenient for his creatures, in the same moment wherein he chooses to create them.

That man partakes of this principle I conclude,

(1.) Because experience shows it.

(2.) Because we observe in ourselves the signs and properties of such a power. We observe we can counteract our appetites, senses, and even our reason, if we so choose; which we can no otherwise account for, than by admitting such a power in ourselves.

2. The more of this power any being possesses, the less subject he is to the impulses of eternal agents; and the more commodious is his condition. Happiness rises from a blue use of our faculties: If, therefore, this be the noblest of all our faculties, then our chief happiness lies in the due use of this; that is, in our elections. And, farther, election is, the cause why things please us: He therefore who has an uncontrolled power of electing, may please himself always; and if things fall out contrary to what he chooses, he may change his choice and suit it to them, and so still be happy. Indeed in this life his natural appetites will sometimes disturb his elections, and so prevent his perfect happiness; yet is it a fair step towards it, that he has a power that can at all times find pleasure in itself, however outward things wary.

3. True it is, that this power sometimes gives pain; namely, when it falls short of what it chooses; which may come to pass, if we choose either things impossible to be had, or inconsistent with each other, or such as are out of our power; (perhaps because others chose them before us;) or, lastly, such as necessarily lead us into natural evils.

4. And into these foolish choices we may be betrayed either by ignorance, negligence, by indulging the exercise of liberty too far, by obstinacy or habit; or, lastly by the importunity of our natural appetites. Hence it appears how cautious we ought to be in choosing; for though we may alter our choice; yet to make that alteration is painful; the more painful, the longer we have persisted in it.

5. There are three ways by which God might have hindered his creatures from thus abusing their liberty. First by not creating any being free; but had this method been taken, then,

(1.) The whole universe would have been a mere machine.

(2.) That would have been wanting which is most pleasing to God of anything in the universe; namely, the free service of his reasonable creatures.

(3.) His reasonable creatures would have been in a worse state than they are now: For only free agents can be perfectly: happy; as, without a possibility of choosing wrong, there can be no freedom.

The Second way by which God might prevent the abuse of liberty, is by overruling this power, and constraining us to choose right. But this would be to do and undo, to contradict himself, to take away what he had given. The Third way by which God might have hindered his creatures from making an ill use of liberty, is; by placing them where they should have no temptation to abuse it. But this too would have been the same, in effect, as to have given them no liberty at all.

I am, dear Sir,

Your affectionate and dutiful son.

III. — To the Same.

June 11, 1731.

OUR walk was not so pleasant to Oxford as from it, though in one respect it vas more useful; for it let us see that four or five and twenty miles is an easy and safe day’s journey in hot weather as well as cold. We have made another discovery too, which may be of some service; that it is easy to read as we walk ten or twelve miles; and that it neither makes us faint, nor gives us any other symptom of weariness, more than the mere walking without reading at all.

Since our return, our little company that used to meet us on a Sunday evening is shrunk into almost none at all. Mr. Morgan is sick at Holt; Mr. Boyce is at his father’s house at Barton; Mr. Kirkham must very shortly leave Oxford, to be his uncle’s Curate; and a young gentleman of Christ Church who used to make a fourth, either afraid or ashamed or both, is returned to the ways of the world, and studiously shuns our company. However, the poor at the Castle have still the gospel preached to them, and some of their temporal wants supplied, our little fund rather increasing than diminishing. Nor have we yet been forced to discharge any of the children which Mr. Morgan left to our care: Though I wish they too do not find the want of him; I am sure some of their parents will.

Some, however, give us a better prospect; John Whitelamb in particular. 2 I believe with this you will receive some account from himself how his time is employed. He reads one English, one Latin, and one Greek book alternately; and never meddles with a new one in any of the Languages till he has ended the old one. If he goes on as he has begun I dare take upon me to say, that by the time he has been here four or five years, there will not be such an one, of is standing in Lincoln College, perhaps not in the University of Oxford.

IV. — To the Same.

June 13, 1733.

THE effects of my last journey, I believe, will make me more cautious of staying any time from Oxford for the future; at least till I have no pupils to take care of, which probably will be within a year or two. One of my young gentlemen told me at my return, that he was more and more afraid of singularity; another, that he had read an excellent piece of Mr. Locke’s, which had convinced him of the mischief of regarding authority. Both of them agreed, that the observing of Wednesday as a fast was an unnecessary singularity; the Catholic Church (that is, the majority of it) having long since repealed, by contrary custom, the injunction she formerly gave concerning it. A third, who could not yield to this argument, has been convinced by a fever, and Dr. Erewin. Our seven and twenty communicants at St. Mary’s were on Monday shrunk to five; and the day before, the last of Mr. Clayton’s pupils, who continued with us, informed me, that he did not design to meet us any more.

My ill success, as they call it, seems to be what has frightened every one away from a falling house. On Sunday I was considering the matter a little more nearly; and imagined, that all the ill consequences of my singularity were reducible to three, — diminution of fortune, loss of friends and of reputation. As to my fortune, I well know, though perhaps others do not, that I could not have born a larger than I have; and as for that most plausible excuse for desiring it, “While I have so little, I cannot do the good I would,” I ask, Can you do the good God would have you do? It is enough! Look no further. For friends, they were either trifling or serious: If