Mr. Bryant's "Analysis of Anciant Mythology"
REMARKS
ON
MR. BRYANT’S “ANALYSIS OF ANCIENT
MYTHOLOGY.” 47
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I BELIEVE this is one of the most remarkable books in its kind, which has been published for some centuries. The author is a person of a strong understanding, deeply acquainted with ancient literature, and has, by much thought, extracted abundance of truth from a vast heap of absurd fables. Many of his discoveries, indeed, do not admit of certainty, but they are highly probable; and of many others, all circumstances considered, we cannot reasonably doubt.
I doubt most of what he terms radicals, as I know not how to answer that question, “In what language does ai, eia, air, etc., signify thus or thus?” Not in Hebrew; not in Syriac; not in Arabic; not in any language that I have the least knowledge of. Therefore I question whether they mean so in any language that is now, or ever was, upon earth. Whatever then is built on this foundation, can be no more than probable.
If you say, “It means so in the Ammonian language,” I ask, How do you know that? Did you ever see a book wrote in that language? No, nor a single sentence. This, therefore, leaves us just as much in the dark as we were before.
One defect more seems to run through the whole work, — entire want of method. Had the dissertations, which are strangely huddled together, been placed in any regular order, they would have been far more agreeable and more intelligible than they are at present.
THOUGHTS UPON TASTE.
[PUBLISHED IN THE YEAR 1780.]
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1. A FEW weeks ago I read with care and attention a celebrated “Essay on Taste.” I cannot say, but I entered upon it with great expectation, as I knew the author to be a man of understanding, and one whose natural abilities were improved by a considerable share of learning. I knew likewise that the performance itself had been highly and generally applauded; yea, that the Doctor had been honored with the medal which is yearly given by the Society to him that produces the best performance on the subject proposed.
2. Yet, to speak the plain truth, I cannot affirm that it altogether answered my expectation. It did not appear to me to be wrote upon a good plan, neither to be well digested. And there are assertions almost in every chapter, which are exceeding disputable. Many of these I could not clearly affirm; some of them I utterly deny. Neither could I find, in the whole tract, any clear, just definition of the subject.
So that after all he has said, one would still be puzzled to answer the question, “What is taste?”
3. But is there any better book upon the subject extant? I do not conceive there is. At least I have not seen it; although there are some ingenious thoughts of Mr. Addison upon it in “The Spectator.” And nearly related to this is his fine “Essay on the Pleasures of Imagination.” But taste is a more extensive word. It does not relate to the imagination only.
4. It may be the more difficult to understand the precise meaning of the word, because there are so few words that are synonymous to it. I do not recollect any, either in Greek or Latin; no, nor yet in the English language. Indeed we have some which are generally supposed to be nearly equivalent with it. So a man of taste is almost the same with a man of genius, a man of sense, or a man of judgment; but none of these mean exactly the same thing.
5. “Most languages,” says Mr. Addison, “make use of this metaphor, to express that faculty of mind which distinguishes the most concealed faults and nicest perfections in writings.” But this definition is far too narrow: For taste refers to other things, as well as writings. And when he adds, “It is that faculty of the soul which discovers the beauties of an author with pleasure, and his imperfections with dislike;” this is too narrow still; for taste is concurred with many things beside authors.
6. What then is taste, in the general meaning of the word? It is certainly a faculty of the mind, analogous to the sense of taste. By the external sense we relish various foods, and distinguish one from the other. By the internal, we relish and distinguish from each other various foods offered to the mind. Taste is therefore that internal sense which relishes and distinguishes its proper object. By relishes, I mean, perceives with pleasure; for in the common acceptation of the word, we are not said to have a taste for displeasing, but only for pleasing, objects. And as various as those objects are, so various are the species of taste.
7. Some of these are objects of the understanding. Such are all speculative truths; particularly those of a metaphysical or mathematical nature. So we say, a man has a taste for metaphysics; which is more than to say, he has judgment therein. It implies over and above, that he has a relish for them; that he finds a sweetness in the study of them. And when we say, a man has a taste for the mathematics, we mean by that expression, not only that he is capable of understanding them, but that he takes pleasure therein.
8. Another species of taste is that which relates to the objects that gratify the imagination. Thus we are accustomed to say, a man has a taste for grandeur, for novelty, or for beauty; meaning thereby, that he takes pleasure in grand, in near, or in beautiful objects, whether they are such by nature or by art. And herein there is an unbounded variety. I mean, in the different tastes of men; some having a taste for grandeur, some for beauty. Some, again, have a taste for one kind of beauty; and others for another. Some have a taste for the beauties of nature; others for those of art. The former for flowers, meadows, fields, or woods; the latter for painting or poetry. But some have a taste both for the one and the other.
9. But is there not likewise a kind of internal sense, whereby we relish the happiness of our fellow-creatures, even without any reflection on our own interest, without any reference to ourselves? whereby we bear a part in the prosperity of others, and rejoice with them that rejoice? Surely there is something still in the human mind, in many, if not in all, (whether by nature, or from a higher principle,) which interests us in the welfare, not only of our relatives, our friends, and our neighbors, but of those who are at the greatest distance from us, whether in time or place. And the most generous minds have most of this taste for human happiness.
10. May we not likewise observe, that there is a beauty in virtue, in gratitude, and disinterested benevolence? And have not many, at least, a taste for this? Do they not discern and relish it, wherever they find it? Yea, does it not give them one of the most delicate pleasures whereof the human mind is capable? Is not this taste of infinitely more value, than a taste for any or all the pleasures of imagination? And is not this pleasure infinitely more delicate, than any that ever resulted, yea, or can result, from the utmost resentments of music, poetry, or painting?
11. As to taste in general, internal as well as external taste seems to belong to all mankind, although infinitely diversified both as to the objects and the degrees of it. When therefore we say, “A man has no taste,” the words are not to be taken strictly, as if he had absolutely no taste at all in any of the foregoing senses; seeing, every man living has, more or less, an internal, as well as external, taste. But they are to be understood in a limited sense. He has no taste, suppose, for metaphysics: He has no discernment, and he has no pleasure, in things of this abstracted nature. Another man has no taste for mathematics: He has neither pleasure nor judgment therein. Meantime the mathematician has no taste either for poetry or music: He does not discern, and he does not relish, the beauties either of one or the other. But every one of these has some internal taste, how dull soever it be.
12. A dull taste is properly one that is faint and languid, that has no lively perception of its object. But sometimes, by a man of a dull taste, we mean one that relishes dull things: Suppose dull, low compositions in music or poetry, or coarse and worthless pictures. But this is more properly termed a bad taste. So one is hugely pleased with the daubing of a sign-post; another with doggerel verses; and a third, with the heavenly music of a pair of bagpipes! Almost every town and every village supplies us with instances of the same kind. We sometimes call this a false taste, as it supposes things to be excellent which are not. In many, it is natural: They have had this wrong turn ever since they were born. But in others, it is gradually acquired either by reading or conversation. Then we term it a vitiated taste: Of this, too, there are abundant instances.
13. On the other hand, he has a good, a just, or a true taste, who discerns and relishes whatever, either in the works of nature or of art, is truly excellent in its kind. This is sometimes termed a correct taste; especially when it is delighted more or less, according to the greater or smaller degree of excellence that is in the object. This differs very little, if at all, from a fine taste; especially as Mr. Addison defines it, — “that faculty of the mind which discerns with pleasure all the beauties of writing:” Should it not be rather, “which discerns all that is grand or beautiful, in the works both of art and nature?”
14. Such a taste as this is much to be desired, and that on many accounts. It greatly increases those pleasures of life, which are not only innocent, but useful. It qualifies us to be of far greater service to our fellow-creatures. It is more especially desirable for those whose profession calls them to converse with many; seeing it enables them to be more agreeable, and consequently more profitable, in conversation.
15. But how shall n man know whether he is possessed of this faculty or not? “Let him,” says Mr. Addison, “read over the celebrated works of antiquity,” (to know whether he has a taste for fine writing,) “which have stood the test of so many ages and countries; or those works among the moderns, which have the sanction of the politer part of our contemporaries. If, upon the perusal of such writings, he does not find himself delighted in an extraordinary manner; or if, upon reading the admired passages in such authors, he finds a coldness and indifference in his thoughts, he ought to conclude, not (as is most common among tasteless readers) that the author wants those perfections which have been admired in them, but that he himself wants the faculty of discerning them.”
16. But how can a man acquire this taste? It “must in some degree be born with us; as it often happens, that those who have other qualities in perfection are wholly void of this. But though it may in some measure be born with us, there are several means of improving it, without which it will be very imperfect and of little use to the person that possesses it. The most natural means is, to be conversant with the writings of the best authors. One that has any taste either discovers new beauties, or receives stronger impressions from the masterly strokes of a great author every time he peruses him.”
17. “Conversation with men of genius is another means of improving our natural taste. It is impossible for a man of the greatest parts, to consider anything in its whole extent. Every man, beside general observations upon an author, forms some that are peculiar to his own way of thinking. So that conversation will naturally furnish us with hints which we did not attend to, and make us enjoy other men’s parts and reflections as well as our own.” Besides, if we converse freely with men of taste, and incite them to “open the window in their breast,” we may learn to correct whatever is yet amiss in our taste, as well as to supply whatever we or they perceive to be still wanting; all which may be directed to that glorious end, the “pleasing all men for their good unto edification.”