Iv.

world,” by the grace of God I shall not persist in these one hour, but instantly choose the more excellent way.

IV.

1. What you urge on the head of enthusiasm also, I think, “deserves my most serious consideration.” You may add, “and presumption.” I let it drop once more; because I do not love tautology; and because I look upon presumption to be essential to enthusiasm, and, consequently, contained therein. I will therefore weigh what you advance concerning it, and explain myself something more at large.

“I am to examine,” you say, “how far you have cleared yourself of enthusiasm. My account of this you set down, making as many alterations and omissions as there are lines.” (Page 120.) Perhaps more; for I never designed to recite the whole, but only the material part of it. If you did not wholly approve of it, why would you not let me know what you disliked in it?” Because I do not love many words. Therefore when the argument stood thus, “He that does this is an enthusiast; but you do this;” was generally content with answering the second proposition, and leaving the first as I found it.

“I laid this charge against you and the Methodists in general; between you every part of the character has been verified.” I answer for one; let the rest answer for themselves, if they have not better employment. That the question between us may be the more fully understood, I shall briefly compare together,

(1.) Your remarks.

(2.) My answer.

(3.) Your reply; though still I cannot promise to repeat your words at length.

2. You remark, “Though you would be thought an enemy to enthusiasm and presumption, yet in both you are far from being inferior to the Moravians, or indeed to any others.” (Page 60.) Strong assertions! Not inferior to any others? not to the French Prophets, or John of Leyden! “(1.) Enthusiasm is a false persuasion of an extraordinary divine assistance, which leads men to such conduct as is only to be justified by the supposition of such assistance.” I answer, “Before this touches me, you are to prove (which I conceive you have not done yet) that my conduct is such as is only to be justified by the supposition of such assistance.” (Page 406.) You reply, “This, I think, is proved in the preceding tract.” (Page 120.) I think not. Let men of candor judge. Yet I am persuaded, there was such an assistance at some times. You have also to prove, that this was a false persuasion.

You remark,

(2.) “An enthusiast is, then, sincere, but mistaken.” (Page 61.) I answered, “That I am mistaken remains to be proved.” You reply, “The world must judge.” Agreed, if by the world you mean men of reason and religion.

You remark,

(3.) “His intentions must be good; but his actions will be most abominable.” I answered, “What actions of mine are most abominable?” You reply, “The world must be judge, whether your public actions have not been, in many respects, abominable.” I am glad the charge softens. I hope by and by you will think they are only abominable in some respects.

You remark,

(4.) “Instead of making the word of God the rule of his actions, he follows only secret persuasion or impulse.” I answered: “I have declared again and again, that I make the word of God the rule of all my actions; and that I no more follow any secret impulse instead thereof, than I follow Mahomet or Confucius.” You reply: “You fall again into your strain of boasting, as if declarations could have any weight against facts; assert, that ‘you make the word of God the rule of all your actions,’ and that I ‘perhaps do not know many persons’” — (Page 121.) Stop, Sir: You are stepping over one or two points which I have not done with.

You remark,

(5.) “Instead of judging of his spiritual estate by the improvement of his heart, he rests only on ecstasies,” And I answered: “Neither is this my case. I rest not on them at all. I judge of my spiritual estate by the improvement of my heart and the tenor of my life conjointly.” To this I do not perceive you reply one word. Herein, then, I am not an enthusiast.

You remark,

(6.) “He is very liable to err, not considering things coolly and carefully.” I answered: “So indeed I am; I find it everyday more and more. But I do not yet find that this is owing to my want of ‘considering things coolly and carefully.’ Perhaps you do not know many persons (excuse my simplicity in speaking it) who more carefully consider every step they take. Yet I know I am not cool or careful enough. May God supply this and all my wants!” You reply, “Your private life I have nothing to do with;” and then enlarge on my “method of consulting Scripture,” and of using lots; — of both which by and by. But meantime, observe, this does not affect the question: For I neither cast lots, nor use that method at all, till I have considered things with all the care I can. So that, be this right or wrong, it is no manner of proof that I do not “carefully consider every step I take.” But how little did I profit by begging your excuse, suppose I had spoken a word unguardedly! O Sir, you put me in mind of him who said, “I know not how to show mercy!” You have need never to fight but when you are sure to conquer; seeing you are resolved neither to give nor take quarter. You remark,

(7.) “He is very difficult to be convinced by reason and argument, as he acts upon a supposed principle superior to it, — the direction of God’s Spirit.” I answered, “I am very difficult to be convinced by dry blows or hard names, but not by reason or argument. At least that difficulty cannot spring from the cause you mention: For I claim no other direction of God’s Spirit than is common to all believers.” You reply,

(1.) “I fear this will not be easily reconcilable to your past pretenses and behavior.” (Page 124.) I believe it will; in particular, to what I speak of the light I received from God in that important affair. (Vol. I.) But as to the directions, in general, of the Spirit of God, we very probably differ in this: You apprehend those directions to be extraordinary, which I suppose to be common to all believers. You remark,

(8.) “Whoever opposes him will be charged with resisting or rejecting the Spirit.” I answered, “What! whoever opposes me, John Wesley? Do I charge every such person with ‘rejecting the Spirit?’ No more than I charge him with robbing on the highway. Do I charge you with rejecting the Spirit?” You reply, “You deny that you charge the opposers with rejecting the Spirit, and affirm, that you never said or thought that what you do is to be accounted the work of God.” Here you blend different sentences together, which I must consider apart, as they were written. And, first, where do I charge you with rejecting the Spirit? If I charge whoever opposes me with this, undoubtedly I charge you. If I do not charge you, that proposition is false; I do not so charge whoever opposes me. Your next words are, “You affirm that you never said or thought that what you do is to be accounted the work of God. If it be the work of God, you need not deny the other point.” Yes, Sir; whether it be or no, I must still deny that I ever charged you with rejecting the Spirit in opposing me.

You remark,

(9.) “His own dreams must be regarded as oracles.” I answered, “Whose? I desire neither my dreams nor my waking thoughts may be regarded at all, unless just so far as they agree with the oracles of God.” To this also you make no reply.

You remark,

(10.) “However wild his behavior may be, whatever he does is to be accounted the work of God.” It was to this I answered, “I never said so of what I do; I never thought so.” This answer was ill expressed. And I might have foreseen you would hardly fail to make your advantage of it. I must therefore explain myself upon it a little farther. You said, “An enthusiast accounts whatever he does to be the work of God.” I should have said, “But I do not account whatever I do to be the work of God.” What that is which I do account his work will he considered by and by.

You remark,

(11.) “He talks in the style of inspired persons.” I answered, “No otherwise inspired than you are, if you love God.” You reply, “The point was not, whether you are actually inspired, but whether you have talked in the style of those who were so.” (Page 126.) That was so much the point, that if it were allowed, it would overturn your whole argument. For if I was inspired, (in your sense,) you could not term that inspiration enthusiasm without blasphemy; but you again mistake my words. The plain meaning of them is, that I talk in the style of those persons who are “no otherwise inspired than you are, if you love God.”

You remark,

(12.) “He applies Scripture phrases to himself, without attending to their original meaning, or once considering the difference of times and circumstances.” (Page 62.) I answered “I am not conscious of anything like this. I apply no Scripture phrase either to myself or any other, without carefully considering both the original meaning, and the secondary sense, wherein, allowing for different times and circumstances, it may be applied to ordinary Christians.” You reply, “This also you deny to have done; holding, however, some secondary sense, (what it is you have not told us,) in which Scripture phrases may be applied to ordinary Christians.” I have largely told you what I mean by a secondary sense, in the First Part of the “Farther Appeal.” You add: “Many things which were truly written of the preaching of Christianity at first, you have vainly applied to yourselves.” Sir, I am to answer only for myself; as I will for that expression, “Behold the day of the Lord is come; he is again visiting and redeeming his people!”

3. I come now to what you expatiate upon at large, as the two grand instances of my enthusiasm. The first is plainly this: At some rare times, when I have been in great distress of soul, or in utter uncertainty how to act in an important case which required a speedy determination, after using all other means that occurred, I have cast lots, or opened the Bible. And by this means I have been relieved from that distress, or directed in that uncertainty.

Instances of this kind occur in third Journal; as also in the last Journal. f46 I desire any who would understand this matter thoroughly, to read those passages as they stand at length.

As to the particular instances, I would observe,

(1.) That with regard to my first journey to Bristol, you should, in any wise, have set down those words that preface the scriptures there recited: “I was entreated, in the most pressing manner, to come to Bristol without delay. This I was not at all forward to do; and perhaps a little the less inclined to it, because of the remarkable scriptures which offered, as often as we inquired, touching the consequence of this removal; though whether this was permitted only for the trial of our faith, God knoweth, and the event will show.” From the scriptures afterwards recited, some inferred that the event they apprehended was yet afar off. I infer nothing at all. I still know not how to judge; but leave the whole to God. This only I know, that the continual expectation of death was then an unspeakable blessing to me; that I did not dare, knowingly, to waste a moment, neither to throw away one desire on earthly things; those words being ever uppermost in my thoughts, and indeed frequently on my tongue: —

Ere long, when sovereign wisdom wills,

My soul an unknown path shall tread,

Shall strangely leave, who strangely fills

This frame, and waft me to the dead.

O, what is death? ‘Tis life’s last shore,

Where vanities are vain no more;

Where all pursuits their goal obtain,

And life is all re-touch’d again.

I observe,

(2.) That in two other of those instances, (Vol. I.) it is particularly mentioned, that “I was troubled;” and that, by the seasonable application of those scriptures, that trouble was entirely removed. The same blessing I received (so I must term it still) from the words set down in page 231; and in a yet higher degree, from that exceeding apposite scripture mentioned in Vol. I.

I observe,

(3.) That at the times to which your other citations refer, I was utterly uncertain how to act in points of great importance, and such as required a speedy determination; and that, by this means, my uncertainty was removed, and I went on my way rejoicing. (Vol. I.) My own experience, therefore, which you think should discourage me for the future from anything of this kind, does, on the contrary, greatly encourage me herein; since I have found much benefit, and no inconvenience; unless, perhaps, this be one, that you “cannot acquit me of enthusiasm;” add, if you please, and presumption.

But you ask, “Has God ever commanded us to do thus?” I believe he has neither commanded nor forbidden it in Scripture. But then remember, “that Scripture” (to use the words which you cite from “our learned and judicious Hooker”) “is not the only rule of all things, which, in this life, may be done by men.” All I affirm concerning this is, that it may be done; and that I have, in fact, received assistance and direction thereby.

4. I give the same answer to your assertion, that we are not ordered in Scripture to decide any points in question by lots. (Remarks, p. 123.) You allow, indeed, there are instances of this in Scripture; but affirm, “These were miraculous; nor can we, without presumption,” (a species of enthusiasm,) “apply this method.” I want proof of this: Bring one plain text of Scripture, and I am satisfied. “This, I apprehend, you learned from the Moravians.” I did; though, it is true, Mr. Whitefield thought I went too far therein. “Instances of the same occur in your Journals. I will mention only one. It being debated, when you should go to Bristol, you say, ‘We at length all agreed to decide it by lot. And by this it was determined I should go.’ (Vol. I.) Is this your way of carefully considering every step you take? Can there be greater rashness and extravagance? Reason is thus, in a manner, rendered useless, prudence is set aside, and affairs of moment left to be determined by chance!” (Remarks, p. 124.)

So this you give as a genuine instance of my proceedings; and, I suppose, of your own fairness and candor! “We agreed, at length, to decide it by lot.” True, at length; after a debate of some hours; after carefully hearing and weighing coolly all the reasons which could be alleged on either side; our brethren still continuing the dispute, without any probability of their coming to one conclusion, we, at length, (the night being now far spent,) all agreed to this. “Can there be greater rashness and extravagance?” I cannot but think there can. “Reason is thus, in a manner, rendered useless.” No; we had used it as far as it could go; from Saturday, March 17, (when I received the first letter,) to Wednesday, 28, when the case was laid before the society. “Prudence is set aside.” Not so. But the arguments here were so equal, that she saw not how to determine. “And affairs of moment left to be determined by chance!” By chance! What a blunder, then, is that, “The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposal thereof is of the Lord!”

This, I firmly believe, is truth and reason, and will be to the end of the world. And I therefore still subscribe to that declaration of the Moravian Church, laid before the whole body of Divines in the University of Wirtemberg, and not by them accounted enthusiasm: “We have a peculiar esteem for lots, and accordingly use them, both in public and private, to decide points of importance, when the reasons brought on each side appear to be of equal weight. And we believe this to be then the only way of wholly setting aside our own will, of acquitting ourselves of all blame, and clearly knowing what is the will of God.” (Vol. I.)

5. You next remarked several instances of my enthusiasm. The first was that of Mrs. Jones. The next ran thus: “Again, you say, ‘I expounded out of the fulness that was given me.’” (Remarks, p. 64.) I answered, “I mean, I had then a fuller, deeper sense of what I spoke than I ordinarily have.” But if you still think, “it would have been more decent to have said, ‘According to the best of my power and ability, with God’s assistance, I expounded;’” I will say so another time.

With regard to the third instance of enthusiasm, you remarked, “If you would not have us look on this as miraculous, there is nothing in it worthy of being related.” (Remarks, p. 64.) I answered, “It may be so. Let it pass, then, as a trifle not worth relating; but still it is no proof of enthusiasm. For I would not have you look upon it as miraculous, but as a signal instance of God’s particular providence.” How friendly and generous is your reply! — “You seem ashamed of it. I am glad you give this fooling up, and hope for the future you will treat your readers better.” (Second Letter, p. 131.) Sir, I am not ashamed of it; nor shall I ever give this fooling up, till I give up the Bible. I still look upon this “as a signal instance of God’s particular providence.” But “how is this consistent with yielding it to be a trifle?” (Ibid. p. 132.) My words do not imply, that I yield it so to be. Being urged with the dilemma, “Either this is related as miraculous,” (and then it is enthusiasm,) “or it is not worth relating;” I answered, (to avoid drawing the saw of controversy,) “Let it pass, then, as a trifle not worth relating. But still” (if it be a trifle, which I suppose, not grant) “it is no proof of enthusiasm. For I would not have you look upon it as miraculous.”

And yet I believe I yielded too much, and what might too much favor your assertion, that “there is a great difference between particular providences and such extraordinary interpositions.” Pray, Sir, show me what this difference is. It is a subject that deserves your coolest thoughts. “I know no ground to hope or pray for such immediate reliefs. These things must be represented either as common accidents or as miracles.” I do not throughly understand your terms. What is a common accident? that a sparrow falls to the ground, or something more inconsiderable than the hairs of your head? Is there no medium between accident and miracle? If there be, what is that medium? When we are agreed with regard to these few points, I shall be glad to resume the subject.

6. The fourth instance of my enthusiasm was this, that I “related judgments inflicted on my opposers.” As to Mr. Molther, I must observe once more, that I do believe there was a particular providence in his sickness. But I do not believe, (nor did I design to insinuate,) that it was a judgment for opposing me.

You go on: “Again you mention, ‘as an awful providence, the ease of a poor wretch who was last week cursing and blaspheming, and had boasted to many that he would come again on Sunday, and no man should stop his mouth then. But on Friday God laid his hand upon him, and on Sunday he was buried.”(Remarks, p. 66.) I answered, “I look on this as a manifest judgment of God on a hardened sinner, for his complicated wickedness.” (Page 410.) You reply, “Add, if you please, ‘His laboring with all his might to hinder the word of God.’ Here therefore is a confessed judgment for his opposition to you.” (Second Letter, p. 133.) There is, for his thus opposing with curses and blasphemy. This was part of his complicated wickedness. Here then you “think I plead guilty.” Not of enthusiasm, till you prove this was not “an awful providence.”

“Again: ‘One was just going to beat his wife, (which he frequently did,) when God smote him in a moment, so that his hand dropped, and he fell down upon the ground, having no more strength than a new-born child.’ Have we any warrant either from Scripture, or the common dispensations of providence, to interpret misfortunes of this nature as judgments?” (Remarks, p. 67.) I answered, “Can you, Sir, consider this as one of the common dispensations of providence? Have you known a parallel one in your life? But it was never cited by me, (as it is by you,) as an immediate punishment on a man for opposing me.” You reply, “As if what is not common, or what I have not known, must be a miraculous judgment.” I believe it was, whether miraculous or no, a judgment mixed with mercy. You now add to the rest the following instance: — “One John Haydon, a man of a regular life and conversation, being informed that people fell into strange fits at the societies, came to see and judge for himself. But he was still less satisfied than before; insomuch that he went about to his acquaintance one after another, and labored above measure to convince them it was a delusion of the devil. We were going home, when one met us in the street, and informed us that J. H.was fallen raving mad. It seems he had sat down to dinner, but had a mind first to end the sermon on ‘Salvation by Faith.’ In reading the last page, he changed color, fell off his chair, and began screaming terribly, and beating himself against the ground. The neighbors were alarmed, and flocked into the house. I came in, and found him upon the floor, the room being full of people, whom his wife would have kept without, but he cried aloud, ‘No; let them all come; let all the world see the just judgment of God.’ Two or three men were holding him as well as they could. He immediately fixed his eyes upon me, and cried, ‘Ay, this is he, who I said was a deceiver of the people. But God has overtaken me. I said it was all a delusion. But this is no delusion.’ He then roared out, ‘O thou devil! Thou cursed devil! Yea, thou legion of devils! Thou canst not stay! Christ will cast thee out. I know his work is begun. Tear me to pieces if thou wilt, but thou canst not hurt me.’ He then beat himself against the ground again, his breast heaving at the same time, as in the pangs of death, and great drops of sweat trickling down his face. We all betook ourselves to prayer. His pangs ceased, and both his body and soul were set at liberty.” (Vol. I.)

If you had pleased, you might have added from the next paragraph, “Returning to J. H., we found his voice was lost, and his body weak as that of an infant. But his soul was in peace, full of love, and rejoicing in hope of the glory of God.”

You subjoin, “This you may desire, for aught I know, to pass as a trifle too.” (Remarks, p. 134.) No; it is so terrible an instance of the judgment of God, (though at length “mercy rejoiced over judgment,”) as ought never to be forgotten by those who fear God, so long as the sun or moon endureth.

7. The account of people falling down in fits you cite as a fifth instance of my enthusiasm; it being “plain,” you say, that I “look upon both the disorders, and the removals of them, to be supernatural.” (Remarks, p. 67.) I answered, “It is not quite plain. I look upon some of these cases as wholly natural; on the rest, as mixed; both the disorders and the removals being partly natural and partly not.” You reply, “It would have been kind to have let us know your rule, by which you distinguish these.” I will. I distinguish them by the circumstances that precede, accompany and follow. “However, some of these you here allow to be in part supernatural. Miracles, therefore are not wholly ceased.” Can you prove they are, by Scripture or reason? You then refer to two or three cases, related in Vol. I. pp. 188, 189. I believe there was a supernatural power on the minds of the persons there mentioned, which occasioned their bodies to be so affected by the natural laws of the vital union. This point, therefore, you have to prove, or here is no enthusiasm; that there was no supernatural power in the case.

Hereon you remarked, “You leave no room to doubt that you would have these cases considered as those of the demoniacs in the New Testament, in order, I suppose, to parallel your supposed cures of them, with those highest miracles of Christ and his disciples, the casting out devils.” (Remarks, p. 63.) I answered, “I should once have wondered at your making such a supposition. But now I wonder at nothing of the kind.” You reply, “Why so? What have I done lately, to take off your surprise? Have I forfeited my character for ingenuous and fair dealing with you?” (Second Letter, p. 135.) Since you ask me the question, I will answer it; I hope, in love, and in the spirit of meekness. I scarce know, of all who have wrote against me, a less ingenuous dealer; or one who has shown a more steady, invariable disposition to put an ill construction on whatever I say. “But why would you not particularly explain these cases?” I will explain myself upon them once for all. For more than three hundred years after Christ, you know, demoniacs were common in the Church; and I suppose you are not unapprised, that during this period, (if not much longer,) they were continually relieved by the prayers of the faithful. Nor can I doubt, but demoniacs will remain, so long as Satan is the “God of this world.” I doubt not, but there are such at this day. And I believe John Haydon was one. But of whatever sort his disorder was, that it was removed by prayer is undeniable. Now, Sir, you have only two points to prove, and then your argument will be conclusive:

(1.) That to think or say, “There are demoniacs now, and they are now relieved by prayer,” is enthusiasm.

(2.) That to say, “Demoniacs were or are relieved, on prayer made by Cyprian, or their parish Minister,” is to parallel the actions of Cyprian or that Minister with the biggest miracles of Christ and his disciples.

8. You remarked, “It will be difflcult to persuade any sober person, that there is anything supernatural in these disorders.” (Remarks, p. 69.) The remainder of that paragraph I abridged thus: You attempt to account for those fits, by “obstructions or irregularities of the blood and spirits; hysterical disorders; watchings, fastings, closeness of rooms, great crowds, violent heat;” and lastly by “terrors, perplexities, and doubts, in weak and well-meaning men; which,” you think, “in many of the cases before us, have quite overset their understandings.” (Remarks, p. 43.) I answered, “As to each of the rest, let it go as far as it can go.” (Let it be supposed to have some influence in some cases; perhaps fully to account for one in a thousand.) “But I require proof of the last way whereby you would account for these disorders.” Why, “the instances,” you say, “of religious madness have much increased since you began to disturb the world.” I doubt the fact. You reply, “This no way disproves it.” (Second Letter, p. 137.) Yes, it does, till you produce some proof. For a bare negation is the proper and sufficient answer to a bare affirmation. I add, “If these instances had increased daily, it is easy to account for them another way,” as is done in the First Part of the Farther Appeal, at the one hundred and thirty-first and following pages. You say, “Most have heard of or known several of the Methodists thus driven to distraction.” I answered, “You may have heard of five hundred. But how many have you known? Be pleased to name eight or ten of them. I cannot find them, no, not one of them to this day, either man, woman, or child.” You reply, “This” (the naming them) “would be very improper and unnecessary.” (Second Letter, p. 138.) However, Sir, it is extremely necessary that you should name them to me in private. I will then, if required, excuse you to the public; which till then I cannot do.

The person I mentioned, whom you threw into much doubt and perplexity, then lived in the parish of St. Ann, Westminster. I related the case just as she related it to me. But she is, able and ready to answer for herself.

9. You go on: “It is the most charitable supposition we can make, that many of the cases you have mentioned in your Journals, and some of which have been represented above, are of this kind,” that is, instances of madness. (Second Letter, p. 138.) O tender charity! But cannot your charity reach one hair’s breadth farther than this? No: For “otherwise” (that is, if those persons were not mad) “the presumption and despair are terrible indeed.” But what, if you were to suppose John Haydon (to instance in one) was not mad, but under a temporary possession; and that others were deeply convinced of sin, and of the wrath of God abiding on them? I should think this supposition (be it true or false) was full as charitable as the other.

I said, “I cannot find one such instance to this day.” You reply, “Yet once you could not but be under some concern with regard to one or two persons, who seemed to be indeed lunatic, as well as sore vexed.” So they seemed; but it soon appeared they were not. The very next paragraph mentions, that one of these, within a few hours, was “filled with the spirit of love, and of a sound mind.” (Vol. I.)

But you are resolved, come what will, to carry this point; and so add, “Toward the end of your Farther Appeal, (First Part, p. 131,) you say, you have seen one instance of real, lasting madness. This was one whom you took with you to Bristol, who was afterwards prejudiced against you, and began a vehement invective both against your person and doctrines. In the midst of this he was struck raving mad.” Add, “And so he continued till his friends put him into Bedlam; and probably laid his madness to my charge.” If they did not, it is now done to their hands.

10. “As to the cure of these fits, I observed,” (so you, p. 139, proceed,) “that you had frequently represented them as miraculous, as the instantaneous consequences of your prayers.” My former answer to this was, “I have set down the facts just as they were, passing no judgment upon them myself, and leaving every man else to judge as he pleases.” I am glad you give me an occasion of reviewing this answer; for, upon reflection, I do not like it at all. It grants you more than I can in conscience do. As it can be proved by abundance of witnesses that these cures were frequently (indeed almost always) the instantaneous consequences of prayer, your inference is just. I cannot, dare not affirm, that they were purely natural. I believe they were not. I believe many of them were wrought by the supernatural power of God; that of John Haydon in particular; (I fix on this, and will join issue with you upon it when you please;) and yet this is not barefaced enthusiasrn. Nor can you prove it any enthusiasm at all, untess you can prove, that this is falsely ascribed to supernatural power.

“The next case,” you say, “relates to the spotted fever, which you represent as being extremely mortal; but you believe there was not one with whom you were but recovered. I allowed that here is no intimation of anything miraculous.” (Remarks, p. 72.) “You ask, ‘Why then is this cited as an instance of my enthusiasm?’ (Page 412.) You sure cannot think, that false pretenses to miracles are the whole of enthusiasm.” No; but I think they are that part of enthusiasm which you here undertook to prove upon me. You are here to prove, that I “boast of curing bodily distempers by prayer, without the use of other means.” (Remarks, p. 71.) But if there is no intimation in my account of anything miraculous, or that proper remedies had not been applied; how is this a proof, that I boast of curing bodily distempers, without applying any remedies at all? “But you seem to desire to have it believed, that an extraordinary blessing attended your prayers. Whereas, if the circumstances could be particularly inquired into, most probably it would appear, that either the fury of the distemper was abated, or the persons you visited were seized with it in a more favorable degree, or were, by reason of a good constitutions more capable of going through it. Neither do I believe that they would have failed of an equal blessing and success had they had the assistance and prayers of their own parish Ministers.”

There, Sir; now I have done as you require; I have quoted our whole remark. But does all this prove, that I “boast of curing bodily distempers by prayer, without the use of any other means?” If you say, Although it does not prove this, it proves that “you seem to desire to have it believed, that an extraordinary blessing attended your prayers;” and this is another sort of enthusiasm: It is very well: So it does not prove the conclusion you designed; but it proves another which is as good!

11. The two last instances of my enthusiasm which you bring, (Remarks, pp. 72, 73,) I had summed up in two lines, thus: “At two several times, being ill and in violent pain, I prayed to God, and found immediate ease.” (Answer, p. 412.) But since you say, I “must not hope to escape so; these instances must once more be laid before me particularly;” (Second Letter, p 140;) I must yield to necessity, and set them down from the beginning to the end: —

“Saturday, March 21. I explained in the evening the thirty-third chapter of Ezekiel; in applying which, I was seized with such a pain in my side, I could not speak. I knew my remedy, and immediately kneeled down. In a moment the pain was gone.” (Vol.

I.)

“Friday, May 8. I found myself much out of order: However, I made shift to preach in the evening. But on Saturday my bodily strength failed, so that for several hours I could scarce lift up my head. Sunday, 10. I was obliged to lie down, most part of the day, being easy only in that posture. In the evening, beside the pain in my back and head, and the fever which still continued upon me, just as I began to pray I was seized with such a cough that I could hardly speak. At the same time came strongly into my mind: ‘These signs shall follow them that believe.’ I called on Jesus aloud, to ‘increase my faith,’ and to ‘confirm the word of his grace.’ While I was speaking, my pain vanished away, the fever left me, my bodily strength returned, and for many weeks I felt neither weakness nor pain. Unto thee, O Lord, do I give thanks.” (Ibid. p. 310.)

When you first cited these as proofs of enthusiasm, I answered, “I will put your argument into form: —

“He that believes those are miraculous cures which are not so, is a rank enthusiast; but

“You believe those are miraculous cures which are not so: Therefore, you are a rank enthusiast.

“What do you mean by miraculous? If you term every thing so, which is ‘not strictly accountable for by the ordinary course of natural causes,’ then I deny the latter part of the minor proposition. And unless you can make this good, unless you can prove the effects in question are ‘strictly accountable for by the ordinary course of natural causes,’ your argument; is nothing worth.”